Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1992

The Rhetoric of Synnationalism: A Model of Foreign Policy
Discourse.
Ralph A. Hamlett
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Hamlett, Ralph A., "The Rhetoric of Synnationalism: A Model of Foreign Policy Discourse." (1992). LSU
Historical Dissertations and Theses. 5383.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5383

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly
to order.

UMI
University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 9302901

The rhetoric of synnationalism: A model of foreign policy
discourse
Hamlett, Ralph A., Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1992

Copyright ©1993 by Hamlett, Ralph A. All rights reserved.

UMI

300N.ZeebRd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE RHETORIC OF SYNNATIONALISM:
A MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Speech Communication

by
Ralph A. Hamlett
B.A., Western Carolina University, 1978
M.A. University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1983
August, 199E

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As with any major project, this study would not have
been completed without the wisdom, patience, and sacrifices
of others.
members:

First, I am grateful to my doctoral committee

Drs. Andrew King, Owen Peterson, Harold Mixon,

J.D. Ragsdale, and Wayne Parent.

Dr. King, director of the

study, provided valuable insights and made numerous
suggestions concerning its content.

But he did far more.

He was willing to tutor me stylistically as he edited the
work.

The result is that the ideas of the project were

improved.
'SAGE.'

In the Ciceronian sense, to him belongs the term
Drs. Peterson and Mixon assisted also with

stylistic suggestions.

More important, these scholars have

shared their love for a rational society and the relevance
of restorative studies.

I am grateful to Dr. Ragsdale and

his insights into communication theory, which he brought to
this project.

His knowledge was helpful for understanding

the reasons of human motivation.
of Dr. Parent.

Finally, I am appreciative

His interests in and concerns for authentic

U.S. citizen participation were the motivational factors
undergirding this study.

11

Second, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my
colleagues at the University of North Texas.

Drs. Ted

Colson, Jill Rhea, Tom Hurt, Richard Morris and Mark DeLoach
and Ms. Jackie Webb were invaluable during completion of the
project.

Particularly, I wish to thank Drs. John Gossett

and Michael Bruner for their support.

Dr. Jay Allison is

specifically acknowledged for his intelligence and editing
skills.

He was willing to read, to correct, and to be a

friend.
Third, I am indebted to all of my professors,
colleagues, friends and students with whom I have been
privileged to cross paths.

In particular, this study has

benefitted from the contributions of Drs. Ken Zagacki,
Donald Loeffler, and Dann Brown, and;

Mr. Dalton R. Paxton,

Mr. Edwin James, Mr. Bill Loytty, and Ms. Jan Dethloff.
I also thank those individuals who are and will remain
a part of my life for their contributions that they have
made.

First are the individuals who stood beside me, but

never saw the completion of this project.
doubted me and in memory I thank them:
Mr. William Alfred Gaddis.

They never

Dr. Gentry Crisp and

I also wish to express gratitude

to those whose support and love never faltered during this
project:

Ms. Susan E. Raines, Gary D. Hamlett, Gerald B.

Hamlett, Cathy Hamlett, Judy Hamlett, Alan Hamlett, and Dana
Hamlett.

111

Finally, to this list of contributors that is not
complete by any means are the most important people in my
life:

my parents, Mr. James Ralph Hamlett and Georgia

Cordell Hamlett.

To these individuals, I owe the greatest

debt—one that I can never repay.

These two individuals

taught me and, then, allowed me to think.

All the while and

although a difficult task, they supported me.
I am ever indebted and dedicate this study to these
people.

To these individuals should go the credit for any

insights this study may offer.
for any of its shortcomings.

IV

I accept full responsibility

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ii

ABSTRACT

vi

CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
Statement of Problem
Contributory Studies.
Significance of Study
Materials and Method of Inquiry
Summary
Notes

1
1
.4
15
18
SO
SI

CHAPTER II:

A SYNNATIONALISTIC MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY
DISCOURSE
The Nature of U.S. Foreign Policy
A Rhetoric of Synnat ional ism
Summary
Notes

AN APPLICATION OF THE SYNNATIONALISTIC
MODEL OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
The Agenda-building Process of American
Foreign Policy
Rhetorical Means of the Systemic Agenda
A Case Study in Systemic Agenda Access
S.D.I, as a Rhetorical Icon
Summary
Notes

S7
S9
43
65
67

CHAPTER III:

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION
Summary and Implications
Suggestions for Future Research
Notes

79
80
.85
94
1S3
145
147
167
..167
17S
176

BIBLIOGRAPHY

177

VITA

189

v

ABSTRACT
The United States, as other nation-states, claims
legitimacy as an agency for the expression of the
aspirations of its people.

This political structure

appeared as part of a historical process that implied a
transfer of authority from ruling elite(s) to the public.
However, U.S. foreign policy discourse evidences an
incomplete relocation of authority.

In matters of

sovereignty and national interests, the policy establishment
considers itself more capable of decisions than ordinary
people.

The establishment tends to view citizens as masses

disinterested in and incapable of understanding vital
decisions of the state.

The policy establishment assumes

the public's role is best limited to a general endorsement
of expert opinion.
This study proposes a model for the analysis of U.S.
foreign policy discourse to explain how popular opinion is
constructed in that arena.

'Synnationalistic discourse' is

used to name this rhetorical genre.

This term is used

because of a tendency of the discourse to produce mass
confidence in and acceptance of foreign policy items as
these are discursively situated in the nation state vision.

VI

This model of discourse analysis is used to discover
how popular support was gained by the Reagan Administration
for a particularly controversial agenda item, the Strategic
Defense Initiative.

This study suggests the Administration

used synnationalistic discourse to recontextualize the
Strategic Defense Initiative as the American mission.

The

result was that S.D.I, became a commanding persuasive
symbol, a rhetorical icon, within the sphere of popular
opinion.
The benefits of this model are two-fold.

Because the

model proposed by this study does not presume rational
standards embraced by the classical tradition, it should be
more useful for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy
discourse.

Second, the model may have a restorative

function, showing how the discourse subverts the rhetorical
tradition by being an instrument for hegemonic control.

By

showing how this speech is constructed, it may suggest a
site from which a citizen voice could enter foreign policy
debate.

VI 1

CHAPTER I
Introduction
American foreign policy must operate within the
parameters of popular opinion.

Governmental and non-

governmental actors, therefore, have to secure the broadest
range of support for their agenda items.

This study

proposes a model for analyzing discourse that the foreign
policy establishment uses to achieve that objective.
This chapter lays the groundwork for the study of
American foreign policy discourse.

The question that the

study addresses is outlined in the first section.

The

second section examines the nature of American popular
opinion, which will lead to a discussion of two rhetorical
works contributing to the model proposed in this study.

The

third section suggests the justifications for this
undertaking.

In the fourth section, materials used for this

study and the method of analysis are discussed.
I
Statement of the Problem
Two problems exist for the U.S. foreign policy
establishment as it attempts to gain popular approval for
its items.

First, while the foreign policy establishment

seems immersed in discussion about strategy and tactics, its
1

2
central terms and foundational policies are

seldom reviewed.

Second, citizens, apart from university based elites and
certain high profile members of the press, are presumed to
be uninformed and apathetic and more interested in private
pursuits rather than the international workings of their
nat ion-state.
This study attempts to answer the following question:
Why is this arena of discourse closed?

By answering this

question, the study may assist individuals to become active
participants in the American foreign policy process and to
view examination of the loci communes of policy rhetoric as
necessary and proper.
Given the present monopoly by experts, this study
argues that traditional models of discourse analysis are
inadequate.

Most of them are

image of an idealized America:

based on a nineteenth century
an informed electorate

applying rational analysis to extended discourse.

At

present, foreign policy discourse envisions a mass public
that does not possess essential background knowledge and
will not invest the time to acquire such information.
Despite its image of a passive public, the discourse is
crafted to delimit debate and, in some cases, to promote
secrecy.

Accordingly, foreign policy discourse does not

lend itself to the analysis of logic, evidence, and
cognition mandated by traditional rational models.

3
This study proposes a model for the analysis of U.S.
foreign policy discourse that is not rationally based.

This

model is predicated on mass confidence in and acceptance of
the nation-state vision.

First, this study argues that

policy advocates construct popular opinion for their agenda
items by drawing from a reservoir of collective thought that
forms the American vision.

This vision presents the United

States as the paradigm and exemplar of an emerging world
society.
Second, this study uses the term

'synnationalistic

discourse,' to name the genre of rhetoric that is employed
in the agenda-setting process of American foreign policy.
By using this rhetoric, foreign policy advocates legitimize
particular agenda items by situating them in the American
vision.

The rhetoric functions to recontextualize policies

within the central terms of the national state.

Thus their

enactment is placed beyond criticism as being necessary for
the survival and fruition of the United States.

Items

become functions of a larger international American mission.
Particular agenda items, operating as rhetorical icons, take
on the power of Foucault's central terms:

nation, people,

God, state, destiny, father and center.
Further, this study argues that synnationalistic
linkage makes rhetorical icons effective in molding popular
opinion.

These links work to produce collective commitment,

serving to construct popular opinion.

II
Contributory Studies
Underlying any rhetorical approach to the study of
American foreign policy is the recognition that governments
must depend on popular consensus in order to operate the
nation-state domestically and internationally.

Henry

Kissinger observes that twentieth century governments are
the "culmination of a process started by the French
Revolution:

the basing of governmental legitimacy on

popular support."1

Kissinger asserts that, "Even

totalitarian regimes are aberrations of a democratic
legitimacy:

they depend on popular consensus even when they

manufacture it through propaganda and pressure."
Public opinion, as an influential component in the U.S.
foreign policy process, is problematic.

The political

establishment holds the assumption that the people are
incapable of participating in the process due to lack of
concern.6

Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder observe that

the majority of Americans demonstrate limited interest and
are reluctant to participate in matters of public affairs!
The conclusion derived from a review of data concerning
public political apathy over a twenty-four year period
<1960-84) seemingly supports this claim:
CFDor almost a quarter of a century, and almost
regardless of changes in political seasons and/or
questionnaire construction, the typical American
has maintained a lukewarm involvement in public
affairs. Indeed, in light of the great changes
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that characterized American political life between
the election of John F. Kennedy and the reelection of Ronald Reagan, this constancy in overall levels of citizen political interest is truly
remarkable.*
The public's apathetic tendency is also reflected in a
public opinion survey and analysis sponsored by the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations.3

The findings reveal that in

the area where citizens "probably" have their greatest
impact on public policy, national elections, participation
is low.4

For instance, from the years 1975 to 1979, 69*/, of

the public claimed to have voted in a presidential election.
While this figure might suggest the majority of the populace
voted, the editor contends that this figure "overstates" the
actual turnout.

Likewise, 63V. of the respondents reported

that they voted in a local or state election; £7'/, to have
asked someone to vote for their party or candidate; 23V. to
have written or spoken to a public official about some
political issue; 22V. to have gone to a political meeting to
hear a candidate speak; and mv, to have worked for a
political party or candidate.7
Several reasons for the causes of apathy have been
advanced.

First, Harry Holloway and John George attribute

the public's political detachment to a conflict within the
psyche of the American individual of private versus public
concerns.8

Holloway and George argue that the apolitical

behavior of much of the population is the result of the
individual being concerned with his/her well-being and
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personal advancement.

These concerns include employment,

health and prospects for their children.

Political

involvement—actual participation and gaining information
concerning political issues—is viewed in terms of cost and
benefits.

Political activity is often viewed as unnecessary

or even "counterproductive."9

Time spent in politics is an

interference to time "that might be otherwise devoted to
work or personal life and leisure."10

Holloway and George

contend that these attitudes lead to "privatism,
. . . a self-centered individualism which tends to
distinguish the personal from the social or public sector of
national life."11
A second cause for apathy may be the 'distance' and
abstractness of many foreign policy concerns.

The

citizenry is thought to be little concerned about U.S.
foreign policy because, as Thomas Graham observes, it is
"more remote from most people's lives" than public policy.16
Citizens' lack of concern has been documented by the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations.

During the period of the

study, only four percent of the general public surveyed
contacted public officials about a foreign policy issue.
Even more important, a declining interest was registered for
information relating to international issues."
Policy makers' acceptance of the general population's
lack of relevant foreign policy information is a major
problem for the survival of a healthy civic culture.

The

7
decision makers assume citizens do not possess the
information to form rational judgments in matters of foreign
policy and thus do not invite their participation in public
dialogue.

The position taken by policy formulators is

comparable to the one suggested by Jacque Ellul that
government "cannot follow opinion; opinion must follow the
government."1*

On the other hand, a 'manufactured'

legitimacy does not reflect a genuine loyalty or commitment
to our public institutions.
While decision makers minimize the role of the public
in the states's international operations, they also are
cognizant of the public's potential.

McGeorge Bundy asserts

that U.S. policy formulators accept that "for many
Americans, foreign policy doesn't really matter, except when
it does."'3

The result is what Ellul states to be the

greatest danger facing the foreign policy establishment—
"public opinion manifesting itself in the shape of crisis"
and overturning previous decisions.16

This damburst is the

result of a public denied access to decision making; it can
only enter the process in a catastrophic way.
This public 'threat' manifests in its ability to deny
elected policy formulators with the loss of legitimacy.
'Legitimacy' is defined here as the belief of the people
that individuals responsible for proposing and implementing
policy, both domestic and foreign, are operating in their
perceived interests.17

Legitimacy is granted in the United
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States when a majority of voters demonstrate through the
electorial process that the 'best' leaders or
representatives have been selected.
Elected individuals by the public demonstration have
valid affirmations of what Max Weber calls "charisma" or
special abilities "not accessible to everybody" to carry out
a mission—in this case, policy formulation and/or
implementation.'8

Authority is maintained until such time

that tenure duly expires or when officials no longer prove
themselves to be the best persons for the position—"the
master sent by the gods.""

The latter occurs when the

officials fail to communicate to the people that they are
operating in the interests of the state.

"It is then that

his mission is extinguished, and hope waits and searches for
a new holder of charisma."20
Breakdowns of legitimacy have been serious in the
foreign policy arena.

The defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980 is

primarily attributed to the Administration's rhetorical
failure.61

The Administration failed to convince a

questioning public that its handling of the Iranian Crisis
was correct.

In Congress, adverse public reaction

registered over the Panama Canal Treaties in 1976.

Members

backing the treaties were accused of 'giving away' the
canal.

An inadequate response to that charge is credited in

part for the defeat of half the senators who supported the
treaties and who were up for re-election in 1978.eB
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Even the fear that legitimacy is crumbling can result in
elected individuals surrendering their entire political
agendas.

Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek re-election

exemplifies a surrender due to the inability of the
Administration's discourse to convince the public of the
legitimacy of its actions in Vietnam.
The switch of legitimacy from one elected official to
another threatens the agendas of the predecessor with
reversal or abandonment.

Therefore, advocates of particular

foreign policy objectives are faced with a paradox.
believe the mass populace is uninformed.

They

But concurrently,

they accept that the populace has the potential to "converge
on one point . . .

to become excited and assert" itself—to

become a public—producing

'undesired' changes and risking

the continuity of foreign policy agendas.Ea
To mollify this potential, policy advocates construct
popular opinion favorable for their propositions.

The

discursive construction of popular opinion has been an area
of continuous inquiry.

In his sixteenth century political

treatise, Machiavelli advised that leaders should depend on
image to lead the masses since knowledge was not possible
for the general populace.8*

The application of the

Machiavellian philosophy was discernable in the use of
'cant' in the conduct of internal and international
relations prior to the twentieth century.

Grant Hugo

defines 'cant' much as modern political speakers define
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'code,' an "esoteric language intended to confuse the vulgar
while conveying a specific meaning to initiates.""
The basing of government on popular support during the
twentieth century has mandated that the citizens possess a
"relatively stable set of predispositions that are
manifested in the form of emotive attachments and
sentimental identifications with the symbols of the
political system."86

While 'deliberate deception' may not

be a necessary characteristic of today's political
discourse, Murray Edelman observes it functions as a
"systematic though unplanned dissemination of illusion"
which creates meaning "not based upon observation or
empirical evidence. "E?
The ambiguity and complexity of international issues
are provided meaning by interfacing the citizens' extant
beliefs and attitudes with current international
identifying the unknown with the known.

issues—by

The interface

occurs because the language of political advocates perform
as 'cuings' for the general public.

Citizens, in turn,

construct meaning from their collective past.68
Philip Wander offers important insights about
argumentative modes of political discourse and how they
function in defining American foreign policy.89

Wander

suggests that foreign policy discourse takes two forms:
"prophetic dualism" and "technocratic realism."

First,

prophetic dualism is a Manichean dualism of good versus
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evil.

It resonates with the world view of Christian

Fundamentalism.

Prophetic dualism is a non-comprising

argumentative form which "divides the world into two
camps."30
The second mode, technocratic realism places efficiency
over morality.

The tone is more "secular, humanistic,

scientific, and negotiable."31

According to Wander, this is

the argument of the expert—the "pragmatic government
bureaucrats and skilled professionals."36
Prophetic dualism is suggested by Wander to be
rhetorically effective for an audience which abides by a
"religious faith, the faith of our fathers, the ideals of
freedom, individuality, a militant God, and the existence of
evil in the world."33

On the other hand, technocratic

realism promotes the view of a "managerial humanist
elite."3*

This form is commanding rhetorically to labor,

racial and ethnic minorities, middle-class professionals,
and the intelligentsia."35
Wander observes that since one form may have stronger
appeal than another depending on the constituency, one mode
can predominate over the other during different periods.
For instance, Wander argues that prophetic dualism was used
by the Eisenhowei—Dulles Administration to attract the
"Protestant Establishment" which dominated the Republican
Party during the nineteen-f if ties.36

When the American

people became "scornful of an America shaped along lines
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laid down by a Republican God and Protestant
Fundamentalists," policy advocates turned to the
argumentative mode of technocratic realism."7

The

rhetorical change was made to attract the scholars,
government bureaucrats, and skilled professionals "who
formed part of the coalition which brought the Kennedy
Administration into power. "aB
Wander writes that these seemingly diametrically
opposed modes of foreign policy discourse "can co-exist,"
and "elements of each may appear in the same speech"

due to

a "deeper level"—a ground:39
Beneath isolated and abstracted form of argument
and the demands of political pluralism is the
realization that arguments over foreign policy
share a world, literally "the world," so deep and
fundamental as to be called the "ground on which
foreign policy is debated in this country. It is
ground shared by various administrations,
Republican and Democrat.*0
Wander argues this teleogical axiom of foreign policy
discourse is nationalism.
The "ideological context wherein this ground is defined
and made to appear natural" is the persona of the United
States.*1

The discourse of political advocates that

personifies the United States cues popular perceptions of
its supreme "mission in a world of nations" with a "moral
and spiritual center raising it above all other nations" in
the international community.*8

It is that collective

perception which dictates that the "United States is the
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manifestation of Truth, Justice, and Freedom placed on this
earth by a God whose purpose it is to make of it an
instrument for extending His spiritual and material
blessings to the rest of humanity."**

When interfaced

successfully with the collective perception, foreign policy
arguments become "pervasive," "obvious," and "free of
challenge" for the populace.**
Foreign policy discourse is viewed as secular speech
with religious dimensions.

Wander implies this religiosity

in his description of the "United States" as ground for
American foreign policy rhetoric:
an Actor with . . .

"Its personification as

a moral and spiritual center."*8

This

study suggests that foreign policy discourse produces a
vision of the United States for the mass public that has
religious rhetoricity.
The persuasive effect on popular opinion is in keeping
with that of traditional religion as assessed by Edward W.
Said:

furnishing the mass population "with systems of

authority and with canons of order whose regular effect is
either to compel subservience or to gain adherence."*6
Thus, the study may suggest that the apathetic
characteristic of American citizens is discourse related.
This study builds from Wander's perspective.

The model

of foreign policy discourse proposed in this study attempts
to show systematically how the interface occurs between
foreign policy items and the collective confidence in the

1<+

mission of the United States.

The model incorporates and

expands a framework of foreign policy that accounts for
ideology and myth.*7

This study accepts the basic premise

posited by Michael Calvin McGee that "Ch3uman beings in
collectivity behave and think differently than human beings
in isolation. . . .

The collectivity is said to 'have a

mind of its own' distinct from the individual qua
individual . "*B
Collective commitment in matters of foreign policy is
identified in this study as synnationalism.

This study

argues that collective support is more extensive than
nationalism.

This tendency is constructed by

recontextualizing agenda items as the American mission.

The

argument is made that when specific agenda items are joined
by discourse with the mission, these become comparable to
what McGee defines as an "ideograph, . . .

a high-order

abstraction representing collective commitment to a
particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal.'"*9
This study, following McGee'5 lead, argues that these
abstractions operate at different levels.
two ideographic tiers.

McGee suggests

One group functions internationally

while the other performs domestically.50

This work contends

the domestic ideographic strata is further divided in terms
of foreign policy and partisan political applications.

The

rhetorical device in discourse primarily intended for a
partisan effect serves to gather "subgroup" support for a
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particular party."

In foreign policy, citizens

are

"united" by synnationalistic recontextualizations "that
represent the political entity 'United States.'""
To distinguish between the two, this study provides a
different nomenclature than that offered by McGee.
'ideograph' is used for partisan applications.

The term

When the

device constructs popular opinion supporting foreign policy
items, the term 'icon' is applied.

This refinement of terms

is used to avoid confusion.
The integration of McGee's contributions with those of
Wander should result in a more functional model for the
understanding of American foreign policy discourse.

This

goal is in keeping with McGee's assertion that "structures
must be understood and described before one can claim to
have constructed a theoretically precise explanation of a
society's ideology."53

Hopefully this research will move

rhetoricians closer to that precision and continue the
progression of knowledge concerning foreign policy discourse
and its construction of popular opinion.

The importance of

such an undertaking is addressed in the following section.
Ill
Significance of Study
The significance of the rhetorical model of U.S.
foreign policy proposed in this study is its pluralistic
perspective.

This perspective attempts to combine and

extend the strategic, metaphoric, and ideological approaches
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that have been used to analyze American foreign policy
discourse.

While other scholars have analyzed foreign

policy dicourse from these singular perspectives, this study
suggests a holistic model to explain the construction of
popular opinion in the foreign policy arena.8*

Singularly,

this provides justification as well as suggests the
significance for the study.

However, this construct's

perspective makes the study meaningful for two other
reasons.
First, the model does not assume the rhetoricity of
rational discourse for the construction of popular opinion,
a position held by the more traditional models."

From the

classical perspective, citizens are conceived to be
responsive to logical arguments and proofs as well as to
emotional appeals.

Furthermore, the traditional approach

assumes that the populace will be actively attentive.
Individuals will possess an educational background equipping
them with a framework including a vocabulary that will
enable them to comprehend and judge logical discourse.
Constructing popular opinion does not lend itself to this
classical tradition of deliberative discourse.

The rational

model's shortcomings are nowhere more apparent than in
presidential debates.

According to Jamieson and Birdsell,

this discourse is a unique form of modern political
communication and "has become the buzz word for
'serious politics.'"5*
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Not only do debates invite a focused attention
uncharacteristic of ads but they also create a
climate in which even those otherwise disposed to
shun political messaging are expected to be able
to converse about political data. . . . "
In a campaign season chock full of spot ads
and news snippets, viewers turn to debates to
provide sustained analysis of issues and close
comparisons of candidates.87
One would expect that because of their atypicality
presidential debates would command rationality.

However,

Jamieson and Birdsell lament this is not the case:
Those who have been ill disposed to concentrate on
politics are unlikely suddenly to devote all their
energy to a ninety-minute learning experience.
And even when motivation spikes attention, new
vocabulary needs time to sink in. Definitions
must be embedded. Time is required to get past
surface meanings to substance.38
So even in the context of the perceived politically
notable event of presidential debates, the classical model
of discourse has limited applications.

Arguably, that model

would even be less beneficial for determining how advocates
construct favorable popular opinion for more obscure foreign
policy.

Because the model proposed by this study does not

presume rational standards embraced by the classical
tradition, it should be more expedient for the analysis of
U.S. foreign policy discourse.
A model that does not privilege rationality suggests a
second justification for the study.

The study may have a

restorative function, showing how the discourse subverts the
rhetorical tradition by being an instrument for hegemonic
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control.

By showing how this speech is constructed, it may

suggest a site from which a citizen voice could enter the
debate.
Insights generated from the study may serve as a means
of eventually restoring authentic legitimacy to the process
of foreign policy.

This form of 'legitimacy,' unlike the

Weberian use of the term, would be as Jurgen Habermas argues
"an accord or agreement among free and equals. "s*

Instead

of a structure of domination and acquiescence, it would be
one of participation.40

The materials and method for

achieving these objectives are presented in the following
section.
IV
Materials and the Method of Inquiry
A variety of materials were used to develop the model
of discourse analysis.

These materials included scholarly

works primarily from communication, political science, and
sociology.

Principally, discourse broadcast by the

television medium was used to operationalize the model.
Artifacts were taken mainly from this medium, because it is
the source "relied" upon by citizens to form their political
views.61

Additional materials consisted of other speech

texts, historical works, magazine and newspaper articles,
and governmental and political documents.

The latter served

to exemplify certain points made by the study as well as to
describe the situational context of the model.
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Speech and interview transcriptions used in this study
were carefully prepared from video and audio recordings.
These were rechecked for accuracy.

Whenever possible,

written transcripts of the discourse appearing in another
source or provided by the medium broadcasting the material
were compared with the recorded broadcasts and the
personally prepared transcripts to further ensure
reliabi1ity.
This study is arranged in the following format.
Chapter Two proposes a model for the analysis of U.S.
foreign policy discourse.
questions.

The chapter answers the following

What part does the nation-state vision play in

American foreign policy?

Why does a foreign policy

establishment continue to dominate decisions in U.S.
international operations?

How does this establishment use

the vision in the construction of popular opinion?
The model is operationalized in Chapter Three.

Some of

the questions addressed in this chapter are:
What are the constraints facing foreign policy items?
means are available for advocates to address them?

What

How did

the Reagan Administration apply these means to redefine an
event the citizens could have perceived as an Administration
failure.

How did the Strategic Defense Initiative become an

icon in the process?
Chapter Four concludes the study.
in this chapter are:

The questions asked

Why does American foreign policy

EO
discourse harm the rhetorical and nation-state ideals?

How

might future research improve the applicability of this
model of discourse analysis?

What are the potential

benefits of this study?
Summary
One of the more fundamental problems facing policy
formulators in the American nation-state is the construction
of popular opinion.

American foreign policy is determined

and put into place by a foreign policy establishment.
actions must be approved by the mass citizenry.

Its

Advocates

must convince its citizens that the proposed actions for the
United States in the international community are correct.
If unable to do so, they risk losing support for policy and
with it the ability to rule.
To show how these advocates cope with this potentially
destabilizing situation, this study proposes a model of
foreign policy discourse that does not assume rational
discourse to be effective for the mass public.

Instead, it

suggests that the rhetoricity of foreign policy discourse is
grounded in collective thought constructing the American
vision.

This model is presented in Chapter Two.
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CHAPTER II
A SYNNATIONALISTIC MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE
The last chapter suggested that U.S. foreign policy
discourse contained an inventional element that constrained
public discussion of certain issues.

This chapter will

attempt to reconstruct salient features of the inventional
process in order to understand why this is so.

As the last

chapter made plain, it is not enough to 'read' the message
in the traditional sense.

A kind of deconstruct ion must be

employed in order to understand how the message arose and
what bases of appeal were used in its construction.
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into two parts:
The first part of the chapter discusses the site of all
foreign policy discourse:

the nation-state.

The second

part discusses a significant feature of that discourse,
the inventional process by which debatable politicies
placed in contexts in which debate is adjourned.

are

This

process is a kind of iconization.
The site of policy discourse is the nation-state.
Sites of discourse determine who can speak, what rules are
applicable, what can be said on a subject.

They are arenas

of constraint and possibility, and those who control the
site of discourse control the content, form, and extent
S7
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of public debate.

In a large sense, the nation-state

functions as a site, just as a courtroom, a public building,
a convention, or a university does.

Thus, a discussion of

the nation-state—its origins, special history, and
particular ethos—is relevant here.
The nation-state claims legitimacy as an instrument for
the expression of the aspirations of its people.

It

appeared as a historical successor to kingship, and it
implied a progressive, internationally pervasive, transfer
of authority from ruling elite(s) to the public.
However, nation-states evidence an incomplete
relocation of authority.

Because of their transcendent

identities extending back into history and forward into the
future, in matters of sovereignty and national interests,
foreign policy custodians consider themselves more capable
of decisions than ordinary people whose horizons are bound
by day to day affairs.

Therefore, they tend to view

citizens as masses incapable of understanding fundamental
decisions of the state.
foreign policy.

This seems to be the case of U.S.

The policy establishment assumes the

public's role is best limited to a general endorsement of
expert opinion.

A participating public might interfere with

the policy's efficacy.

U.S. foreign policy discourse is

articulated, therefore, to provide the illusion of citizen
participation by constructing popular support.
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In the second section, the model is described.

This is

a process of message construction in which policy objectives
are linked to the centering terms of the national vision.
Effective American foreign policy discourse is one that
successfully recontextualizes items with this vision.
result is a mythic identity for the item.

The

This

recontextualization, a rhetorical icon, has synnationalistic
tendencies that unify individuals and construct favorable
popular opinion.

In this light, metaphoric similarities

seem to exist between the Christian icon and the rhetorical
icon in the sense that both make use of abstract universal
terms that bind individuals to ideas beyond their mortal
existence and human limits.
I
The Nature of U.S. Foreign Policy
The vesting of sovereignty in the nation-state and the
importance of popular consent for the structure's
international recognition represent a fundamental visionary
shift of the system from that of its immediate political
precursor, dynastic orders.

This earlier political

formation had gained prominence by the nineteenth century in
"most of the important states in international politics."1
The structure's political principle was the dynastic
centralization of political authority.

This principle

affirmed that within their "defined territories," dynasts
were the "only rule-making and rule-applying bodies."E

The
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location of authority was characteristic of the legal
doctrine of sovereignty described by French political
theorist, Jean Bodin in his 1576 work, De La Republique,
that the ruler "cannot in anyway be subject to the commands
of another, for it is he who makes the law for the subject,
abrogates law already made, and amends absolute law."3
Dynastic sovereignty was functional because of the
existing vision.

This vision was constructed from the

"consensus of political values that prevailed in Europe, the
cosmopolitanism of the upper classes, the regard for
principles of royal authority and Christianity."*
People still thought in terms of a hierarchy of
social classes, each with its special rights,
privileges, and obligations, rather than in terms
of natural rights and natural laws that applied
equally to all persons. Their loyalties were to
their towns, provinces, and ruling dynasties
rather than to nation-states or their fellow
citizens, 5
The "age of egalitarian revolutions" beginning during
the latter seventeenth century and continuing until the
middle of the nineteenth century challenged this philosophic
underpinning of dynastic sovereignty—the divine right of
kings and principles of royal succession as well as the
stability inherent within the system.6

The result was

emerging visions for social advancements and change through
competing political institutions.

These ideas were

incorporated from the Enlightenment and the economic revival
of the eighteenth century:
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. . . CTDhe growing belief that the mind of man
was devoid of ideas at birth gave rise to the
theory that all men were created equal and were
capable of being molded by their environment. The
hierarchical conception of society was
discredited, and the idea that social and moral
progress could be achieved by creating the proper
environment gradually replaced the older desire
for stability and order. At first, the proper
environment was thought to be one in which
everyone could exercise his natural rights and
obey governmental regulations that were made in
accordance with natural law. Gradually, the
concept was expanded to include democracy and the
right of each nationality to govern itself.'
The period that has been termed a "middle-class
revolutionary movement" and from which the French Revolution
arose initiated the new visions and with it the gradual
sovereign shift from dynasts to the mass public.8

The

people became more active participants with the visions in
that they shared their destinies with the state.9

The

movement's effects on the mass public were the "development
of strong emotional attachments to the central state (adding
to the traditional loyalties to provinces or towns) and
involvement of the average citizen or subject in his
government's political life.'"0

These centering w o r d s —

State, Citizen, Nation, People—became the sacred terms of a
secular religion.
The movement's visions produced a reformation of
political structures extending from western society where
the thought was ascendant to all areas of the globe."
Instead of the government creating the state, in the last
two centuries, the vision of social improvement
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institutionalized by political environments and supported by
popular opinion has "preceded, and in many cases created,
the state. ",E

This reformation is reflected in the fact

that internal popular consent, real or manufactured, is
considered a necessary condition for official modern nationstate sovereignty.

The status empowers the United States

and other polities to join the international community as
"legal persons" and provides for autonomy in their internal
operations .,3
Established nation-states confer the internationally
recognized legal status in accordance with a state's
capabilities for meeting certain preconditions.

These

provisions include the state's "stability of organization
and administration," the "ability to regulate its internal
affairs without outside interference or control," and
"specific international capacities."1*
Ultimately, internal popular consent is deemed
instrumental in the satisfaction of these requirements.
Without a consenting plurality, coerced or democratically
induced, multiple factions might disrupt any potential for a
state's operational continuity domestically or
internationally.

This perhaps would result in an

opportunity for external interventions or subjugation.
Since changes in the form of government or in the
personnel who operate the government do not necessarily
affect political stability, sovereignty, unlike the previous
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political thought, resides in the nation-state itself and
not in one person whether dictator, monarch, or elected
official.

The government, presiding either as a group or an

individual, is granted transitory sovereign attributes when,
and only as long as, it is recognized to have tenable
authority based on the assent or acquiescence of its
population empowering it to act.18
The involvement of the citizenry in the operations of
the nation-state allows for popular influence in what had
been once the private domain of the dynasts.

For instance,

in foreign affairs, the "greater involvement of the average
citizen or subject . . . imposes restrictions on the policy
makers' freedom of action."16

An example is Quebec, where

a provincial mobilization of voters has resulted in a
partial withdrawal of support for the central government at
Ottawa.
While the latitude of government actions has been
narrowed by popular influence, at the same time, the policy
process of nation-states clearly shows that the decentering
of authority is only partial.

Autocratic structures, for

example, contemplate public reaction and its ramifications,
but authority comparable to the dynasts remains centralized.
Ithiel De Sola Pool attested to this fact in a 1960
description of how the Kremlin elites' handled the "force"
of Soviet public opinion by "brutal suppression," and "by
creating diversions and camouflage."17
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The United States policy process because of and in
spite of its representative arrangement and a vast
commercial press also evidences a relative passivity and
even disinterest of the people in decision making.

This is

so even though the U.S. structural and cultural orientations
provide for potentially powerful popular participation:18
Some form of pluralism is more plausible than
the single elite model of power structure but it
still leaves us with a most imperfect democracy.
. . . Elites, whether political, corporate,
professional, or whatever, have far more influence
than the bulk of the population. For good or ill
a relatively small number have much more to say
about policy matters than the people at large.
The results are at odds with the equality implied
by classic democratic theory. To reject the
single elite theory is not to ignore the
substantial inequalities present."
Domestic structures juxtaposed with the nature of
states' policies may suggest why the foci of power are more
centralized in some nation-states than in others.

The

overriding purpose for nation-state operations is survival
of its vision.80

When domestic and foreign policies

interlock for national security interests as in ideological
or revolutionary regimes, popular participation may seem
disruptive to the vision.81

For instance, in an

ideological nation-state, doctrine provides the vision of
the state.Be

As long as the doctrinal vision remains

operational, it motivates both domestic and foreign policy
under its rubric.
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Similarly, the warrant for the revolutionary nationstate, the vision of self-determination, effectively
combines both elements of policy.8*

The revolutionary

nation-state must secure for itself political and economic
stability that may be impossible through domestic policies
alone."

Therefore, "foreign policy is domestic policy

pursued by other means; it is domestic policy carried beyond
the boundaries of the state."8*

John Spanier addresses the

importance of this association in his discussion of foreign
policy benefits to governments of revolutionary nationstates.

He writes that in these states the "only way of

arousing the people and keeping them united is to continue
the struggle" against a perceived external threat."

The

governments "preserve their power by externalizing domestic
dissatisfaction" by finding "foreign scapegoats . . .

to

relieve internal stresses and strains. "e8
In both of these regimes, domestic and foreign policy
are inseparable from the guiding state visions.

They are

united in ideological polities because the pervasive
"analytical framework" makes them heuristically
interdependent .e* While in revolutionary states,
unification of policy is functionally vital 30
These domestic structures centralize authority and
limit citizen participation.

In the former, participation

is not needed because "ideology is official, and its
interpretation Cits implementation domestically and
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internationally] is the task of the Party leaders, who
regard their reading of the ideology as embodying the only
true view of society and history; as 'true believers.'"31
In the latter, a single leader or one party symbolizes the
state vision of nation-building and use domestic and foreign
policy concurrently as the means for its consummation.3E
Citizen input in the policy process is suppressed because it
imposes threats to the government's personification as the
vision.
State structures that allow for greater separation
between policies and state vision enhance the opportunity
for public participation, exhibiting a more decentralized
location of authority.
States.

Such is the case of the United

First, U.S. domestic and foreign policies are

separated by different operating presumptions.

Domestic

policy is not guided by a singular vision and its
protection.

Its quintessence is a multiplicity of public

interests.33

The policy may assume threats to the structure

of the internal organization, but these are

generally

situational, perhaps brought about by failed policy or
natural catastrophe.
U.S. foreign policy, on the other hand, is directly
linked to sovereignty and the state vision.3*

Its

supposition is maintenance of self-determination for the
nation-state and from that the international advancement of
its vision.

The assumption exists that the state must
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compete globally for the satisfaction of its interests
against rational adversaries.33

These adversaries vie in

the international arena for their own objectives which

are

perceived more often than not as mutually exclusive and
frequently detrimental to U.S. interests.

With security

resulting from successful rivalry, the state is able to
further its vision.
Second, these distinctions produce different attitudes
concerning citizen input in U.S. policy processes.

Unless

faced with a perceived catastrophic upheaval, domestic
policy operates within the established structure for
internal policy.

The orientation is grounded within the

advocacy tradition of a representative democracy.

This

allows for mediated citizen influence through prolonged
debate.

Morton A. Kaplan notes that "majorities should not

work their will immediately but only after delay . . . . "36
The "underlying consensus is that the majorities, if they
can sustain themselves, ultimately should have their
way . . . "37
The domestic advocacy process allowing for citizen
input is judged less suitable for foreign policy.39

The

inclination of that policy establishment is to equate
American foreign policy with the solution of immediate
issues necessary for the success of the long-term vision.39
Public participation through extended debate is deemed
counterproductive in this atmosphere often characterized by
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a sense of urgency resulting in a need for secrecy and
"combative solidarity."*0

George H. Questor details these

two postures inherent in U.S. policy processes:
In the domestic sector, we do not find
ourselves adopting the working assumption of
having an adversary, a rational antagonist against
whom we must close ranks. In the prevention of
floods or epidemics, or the avoidance of
unemployment, we do not steel ourselves to worry
that "the enemy might be listening."
One can think of relatively few issues on the
domestic side which impose a continuing need for
secrecy. Advance information on the next location
of new highways or the timing of currency
devaluations must be held closely, of course, but
these are the exceptions, rather than the rule.
By contrast, secrecy is almost the rule in foreign
policy, with openness the exception, because the
foreign ministry of another state might exploit
our openness. But the secrecy is indeed merely
the symptom of a broader form of institutionalized
hostility toward foreign governments, and
institutionalized expectations of loyalty among
one's own citizens. While American Congressmen on
domestic issues are urged to have split loyalties,
taking their constituents' wishes and needs into
account, but also paying attention to national
needs, no such diversity of goals is advocated for
the foreign policy practitioner. As a working
myth, foreign service academies still use
something like "my country above all" as their
first approximation of a goal.*1

The U.S. structural orientation and its juxtaposition
with policy may explain the nature of its foreign policy
discourse.

On one hand, the U.S. structure promotes

decentralized power.

But the perceptual contrasts between

purposes of policy makes decentralization, while not
complete, more apparent and desired at the domestic rather
than at the foreign policy level.

U.S. foreign policy
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discourse may have a similar objective for its citizens as
the effects attempted by regimes whose structural
orientations are less democratic and both domestic and
foreign policies are joined.

This objective would be the

acquiescence of the majority of citizens.
The objective may be similar because all nation-state
policy formulators are faced with a comparable problem:

How

to join its people with the state in matters considered to
be or presented as vital for the nation-state vision?

This

is the utmost challenge for advocates because of the myriad
of nations as people—their "ethnicities" as well as
interests—residing within the boundaries of the nationstate—the "formal political organization which grants
citizenship . "*e
Without uniting the majority of its people behind its
proposed actions, the advocates would have to compete with
others for the position best enunciating and/or advancing a
majority vision.

While this might be structurally desirable

in domestic policy of democratic societies such as the
United States, internal competition would defeat the
immediacy and secrecy perceived necessary for foreign
policy.

Advocacy in the policy process of autocratic

regimes would or could be seen as a challenge to either the
ideologies or the governments' symbolic role as the nationstate. In any case, policy formulators in these structures
might risk losing the prerogative to speak for the people.

To gain mass support for their foreign policy agendas,
advocates must construct effectively a perception within the
majority of people, while their interests may be
domestically diverse, that they share a common vision, a
destiny, with the nation-state.

Advocates, operating on the

peoples' behalf, speaking with a single voice, protect and
promote this destiny where it might be threatened.
Arguably, policy formulators attempt to meet this
demand by drawing from and/or recycling a reservoir of
collective thought producing what Karl Deutsch addresses as
a higher order of nationalism.*3

The term, synnationalism

is used here to suggest such a cumulative nationalism that
reflects more support than nationalism.

Synnationalism

would result in the nation-state as a "terminal community"—
"the largest community that, when the chips are down,
effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims of
both the lesser communities within it and those that cut
across it within a still greater society."**
Synnationalism is seemingly possible because of a
metaphoric affinity of nation-state vision to religious
vision.

The correlation is suggested in Emile Durkheim's

theoretical discussion of the religiosity of society.*5

The

parallel occurs because both thoughts, religious and
societal, share a "heterogeneity" that "characterizes the
sacred from the profane"—the ideal vision and experienced
real i ty .**
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Society, which Durkheim argues is the source of all
religious thought, participates in the real world and at the
same time imports an "ideal."*7

Even though individuals

cope with the imperfections of society, Durkheim contends
that they strive and hope for a "perfect society, where
justice and truth would be sovereign and from which evil in
all its forms" is "banished forever."*6

Durkheim concludes

that this thought "is in close relations with the religious
sentiment.

. . . CI3t is towards the realization of this

that all religions strive."*'
Durkheim posits that this analogous relationship of
societal and religious vision provides the basis for a
collective inventional framework.30

From Durkheim's

perspective, the purposiveness of societal religiosity for
individuals within the collective is that society's vision
tends to be hermeneutically more authoritative for an
individual than an interpretive framework she/he would have
in isolation.s*

This became the basis for the Durkheimian

idea of society as transcendence, an entity that justified
and sometimes encouraged individual sacrifice.
secular person retain a God:

Even the

society.

This position is in keeping with the "essential
character of the religious spirit" as postulated by Alfred
North Whitehead.se

Society would supply the "vision of

something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the
passing flux of immediate things; something which is real,
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and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote
possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts;
something that gives meaning to all that passes.""

The

effect would be an optimism enriching what otherwise might
be a "basatelle of transient experience."3*

This, Durkheim

argues, has the potency to unite individuals into "one
single moral community"—society."

Durkheim found

similarities between the secular organizations (Military)
and religious organizations (Catholicism).

Despite a wide

difference in goals, tactics, and values, the organizations
inspired an abstract and idealized mode of commitment.
If Durkheim's thesis is correct, the nation-state
vision, an agent of the largest and more pervasive unit of
society, would be commanding due to its purport.

This has

been conceptualized as "the absolute solution to history and
life"—a kind of immortality.56

For instance, Carlton J.

H. Hayes makes the following observation that "CtDo national
state as to Universal Church, is attributable a mission of
salvation and an ideal of immortality.

The nation is

conceived of as eternal, and the deaths of its loyal sons
only add to its undying glory."37
This optimistic assurance arguably has the potential to
elicit a similar response from members of nation-states as
that of "human nature to religious vision,"—a "surrender to
the claim for assimilation."38

For the individual, this

would be a synnationalistic tendency, a submission to the
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nation-state vision that when invoked overrides other
factional loyalties.
Plausibly, popular support for nation-state foreign
policy can be explained in terms of advocates' abilities to
effectively produce synnationalistic attachments for policy
items.

From this standpoint, policy formulators establish

or maintain necessary mass support for their agenda by
constructing a popular opinion that foreign policy items are
fundamental and consonant with the nation-state vision.
This is achieved in autocratic regimes through force or
pressure because internal advocacy, for the most part, is
structurally excluded.

In such regimes, supportive mass

opinion in the policy process ostensibly is little more than
coerced acquiescence orchestrated by governmental
mechanisms."
U.S. policy formulators, as other nation-states with
democratic structures must construct supporting opinion
through rhetorical discourse.

This discourse allows for but

delimits debate by interfacing policy items with the nationstate vision.

The framework for a model to analyze this

discourse is discussed in the next section.
II
A Rhetoric of Synnationalism
To construct popular opinion, the U.S. foreign policy
establishment frames its policy language and imagery that
maximizes synnationalistic tendencies in its citizens.

This
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discourse resonates with the individuals' identity with the
American vision.

The majority of U.S. citizens assimilate

their national identity through early socialization and day
to day life in a environment rich with nationalistic
messages.

This usually is a cradle to grave discursive

process, as Harold Lasswell asserts, beginning with
citizenship, the "national rite of baptism," and continuing
through social discourse, in which "the state solicitously
follows him through life, tutoring him in a national
catechism, teaching him by pious schooling and precept the
beauties of national holiness.40

The icon is essentially

epideictic rather than analytical.

It functions as a

reminder, a 'presentness' of the state in remote places.
Lasswell argues that these interactions exist at all
levels within the American system.61

They manifest in

nation-state rituals as standing, hand-over-heart, while
reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance" or singing the "Star
Spangled Banner"; in myths of heroism told and retold in
homes, schools, churches, and other social groups or
dramatized by the media; in national celebrations, e.g.,
July 4th observances; and in physical artifacts such as
coins and memorials that surround individuals in everyday
life.
Individuals collaborate with this discourse, resulting
for many, in acceptance of and loyalty to the construct of
the United States' vision.

This construct presumes that the

<*5
environment

institutionalized

serves the humanitarian

by the American system best

interests domestically and

internationally and, therefore, is superior to other
systems.

The vision exemplifies a Manicheanism

predicated

on a heterogeneity between the United States and other
polities.
ideal

The United States polity is the ideal.

is c o r r e c t — g o o d

That

and m o r a l — w h i l e the non-ideal

(polities outside the American sphere) is w r o n g — e v i l
immoral. 66

The ideal functions as a sacred.

As stated
directly

or

in the previous section, the construct

is

linked to foreign policy, whose accepted ends are

its protection and promotion internationally
more perfect world community.

leading to a

This goal, described as the

"American mission," seeks to re-shape the world polities in
the U . S . image. 63
fabric

The thought embedded

in the visional

is that if others could choose, the choice would

be

the American way; if people could experience the American
system or a facsimile thereof, they would opt for

that

system.
The vision has its resonance in discourse used to
construct the American identity.

Kissinger asserts, "A

sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American history; to
most Americans, America has always stood for something
than its own grandeur."**
stated

other

For instance, Thomas Jefferson

in 1801, "A just and republican government

maintained

here will be a standing monument and example for the aim of
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the people of other countries."43

Although Jefferson's

example was an internal rather than a world mission, it
continues to resonate in our foreign policy.

The thought

has been recycled by discourse throughout U.S. history as
evidenced by President Carter's statement in 1977 that: "We
are confident that democracy's example will be compelling,
and so we seek to bring that example closer to those . . .
who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind
of life.""
Arguably, a hermeneutic framework for U.S. foreign
policy emerges from the collective ideas expressed by
discourse that forms this vision.

Individuals do not share

one commonly held view of the American mission anymore than
they do of 'liberty' or 'democracy.'

But as Durkheim

writes, "in incarnating themselves in individuals,
collective ideas tend to individualize themselves.

Each

understands them after his own fashion and marks them with
his own stamp; he suppresses certain elements and adds
others."67

The American vision, as Hans Morgenthau argues

of ideology, grows "out organically from the very conception
Americans have formed of who they are and what they are all
about in their relation with other nations."48
Arguably, the conceptualization of the American vision
is constructed from individually assimilated discourse,
historic and recycled, that professes United States'
international interests necessary for survival and fruition

47
of the U.S. nation-state.

Although widespread, these

interests can be delimited to three dimensions:

defense,

economic, and world order.6' First is defense or protection
of American people, territory and institutions against any
potential foreign dangers.

Through discourse, the historic

dicta are internalized that enemies "are real," and
"external vigilance is the price of freedom."70
The economic interest results from the interplay of
individuals with the U.S. capitalist praxis.

The sentiment

embedded, though amorphous, presumes a common locus similar
to that professed by Benjamin Franklin that "CiDndustry and
constant employment are preservations of the morals and
virtue of a nation.""

The economic interest is juxtaposed

to the vision because of the ideal that the U.S. economic
system is necessary for the "social destination to take care
of itself" that "allows the social universe to unfold . . .
beyond human interference."76
Finally, the world order interest takes the form of an
American responsibility to all nations of the world.

Henry

Kissinger writes that this obligation "is part of American
folklore that, while other nations have interests, we have
responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with
equilibrium, we are
peace."73

concerned with the legal requirements of

This area of interest dictates that American

foreign policy should be directed for the establishment of a
peaceful international environment in which disputes between
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nations can be resolved without resort to war.

The

assumption exists that the natural order is one of peace.
Problems produce conflict and war.

If problems exist,

"plans can be made for meeting them."7*
These sentiments are continually born anew in the
affirmations of particular individuals.

For instance, the

defense interest is recycled through discourse as when Jimmy
Carter stated in his Farewell Address that: "National
weakness, real or perceived, can tempt aggression and thus
cause war.

That's why the United States can never neglect

its military strength.
strong."75

We must and we will remain

The interest was reaffirmed in Ronald Reagan's

observation that:

"We . . . live in a world that's torn by

a great moral struggle—between democracy and its enemies,
between the spirits of freedom and those who fear
freedom."74

The economic interest is renewed through

statements comparable to President Reagan's summons to
"reawaken" the American "industrial giant" in order for the
United States to be once again the "exemplar of freedom and
a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom."77
As with defense and economic interests, a distinctly
American version of world order is constructed through
discourse.

John Kennedy affirmed this version in the

following words:

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the
United Nations, our last hope in an age where the
instruments of war have far outpaced the
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instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of
support—to prevent it from becoming merely a
forum for invective—to strengthen its shield of
the new and the weak—and to enlarge the area in
which its writ may run.78
The discourse expressing these interests is generated
from hermeneutic bases for U.S. foreign policy, loci
communes or shared perceptual commonalities.

The importance

of these archetypes is that they are traces of contexts that
individuals have experienced by participating with societal
discourse that bespeak the essentials of the United States
vision.
These archetypes, while they lie latent in the
individual's subconscious, can be activated by fresh
discourse, making interpretation possible."

One way of

understanding the process is in terms of Ogden and Richard's
theory of signs:
. . . when a context has affected us in the past,
the recurrence of merely a part of the context
will cause us to react in the way in which we
reacted before. A sign is always a stimulus
similar to some part of an original stimulus and
sufficient to call up the engram formed by the
stimulus.80
The effect of calling up the archetype expands the
contextual trace to a position of referent signified by the
sign.
The theory can be applied in the following situation.
An American citizen is told that nonvalue-assigned Country
'X' has adopted a socialistic government.

In this instance,
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the sign is 'socialism.'

Archetypes exist with abstract

emotional attachments to capitalism and opposition to
socialism.

The archetypes are the product of numerous

accounts, richer contexts, of the virtues of the former and
the abomination of the latter.

Perhaps these have been told

in stories of socialistic countries 'Y' and 'Z.' For
example, the individual has been told how the peoples of 'Y'
and 'Z' are

automatons controlled by the state with little

or no hope for their future.

These thoughts are associated

with the people of country 'X.'

In the process, 'X' loses

its value anonymity.
While the theory of signs may demonstrate the
importance of the archetype, it fails to show how
synnationalistic attachments can be constructed for foreign
policy items.

A more accurate description that accounts for

the unifying tendencies of foreign policy discourse
seemingly would be one that attempts, as Michael Calvin
McGee suggests, "to see a legitimate social reality in a
vocabulary of complex high-order abstractions that refer to
and invoke a sense of 'the people.'"81

The approach

ostensibly would be one that provides for an expansion of a
referential archetype to a level rhetorically effective for
the majority of citizens.
Mythology may indicate such an expansion.

'Mythology'

is intended here, as Roland Barthes writes in his methodical
description, as the "study of a type of speech. "BE

This
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type of speech, myth, Barthes asserts, is a language whose
message constructs a reality by drawing from historic
meaning.83

Barthes' approach for the analysis of this

language is the study of "ideas-in-form"—"part both of
semiology inasmuch as it is a formal science, and of
ideology inasmuch as it is an historical science."8*
According to Barthes, myth is a second order
semiological system "constructed from a semiological chain
which existed before it."85

The originating system similar

to that discussed above consists of a signifier (an image),
a signified (a concept), and a sign (the relationship
between concept and image).
This tripartite schema can be demonstrated using the
previous example of country 'X.'

The 'capitalism good-

socialism bad' archetype is an image existing suspended as a
mental state.

In suspension, the image exists as a

preconceived attitude, a predisposition that readily
attaches itself to an unknown substance when stimulated.
The concept, the second term of the system, supplies the
trigger in that it confronts the individual with country
'X,' which lacks a contextual definition and results from
the 'telling about' of that country to the individual.
'telling' process works in conjunction with secondary
conditions, non-contextual thoughts of Country 'X' that
existed prior to or derived from the process.

The third

term in the semiological chain, the sign, is the

The
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relationship of signified to signifier being the
"associative total" of the archetype and country 'X.'84

The

sign ultimately is the contextualization of 'X' for the
individual.
The second order system, myth, begins with this product
of the first system.

But whereas sign is contextualization

in the first order, at the mythic level, it becomes form.
Form unites with concept resulting in recontextualization.
The process, as described here, transforms meaning derived
from the first semiological system that might be limited to
the individual into a more pervasive universal, "an opinion
molecule," that registers in the foreign policy process.87
Myth according to Barthes is predicated on the second
term of the system, the concept.

Concept is what Barthes

asserts to be the "motivation . . . which causes myth to be
uttered."88

In foreign policy discourse, the concept of

myth would be the assimilated expressions of United States'
interests held by individuals—defense, economic, and world
order.

The concept in this discourse would not be the

"purified essence" of one interest but would exist as a
"formless, unstable, nebulous condensation"—the construct
of the American vision.89
The signifier, the form, would crystalize specific
interests.

For example, the economic interest is

contextualized by the 'capitalism good-socialism bad'
Country 'X.'

The stories of 'Y' and 'Z,' embroiled in the
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archetype of socialism, are personified in the existence of
'X.'

If 'Y' and 'Z' were blamed for previous wars, 'X'

predictably would be seen as a potential threat not only to
the U.S. nation-state but to a peaceful world climate.
For the concept to function as a unifier of American
interests, the verifiable record of the form by design would
be exploited.

Mythic form differs from the image of the

first order semiological system in that the latter is
archetypal.

That image is non-entity-specific.

Form of the

second order can not exist comparably since it originates as
the sign of the first system.

In the orbit of meaning, both

sign and its derivative embrace an archetypal charged
entity.

This entity is specified in that the emotional

charge unites with an object and its material record.

In

the example of Country 'X,' meaning includes the archetype
along with the country's geo-political and cultural
histories.
The peculiar system of myth, its ability to unite
individual interests, demands manipulation of these
qualities.

If the form appears as a unique isolated symbol,

the concept would be obscured.

The economic interest as

well as defense and world order become of no concern.
Country 'X' may have had a past history of being ruled by
dictators operating under the guise of capitalism.

The

populace perhaps had suffered seeing their nation's wealth,
their potential, being robbed by a handful of elites.

If
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this were the case and had existed over decades, a citizens'
revolt against those who had oppressed

them to replace that

rule with a more distributive economic

system—socialism—

might seem

justifiable.

With a potential for awareness of that record, the U . S .
populace, while they might accept the

'capitalism good-

socialism bad' charged entity, perhaps would question or
even deny a concept which no longer could be supported
the Country

'X' form.

by

By drawing attention away from the

record, the concept signified by the form, in this instance,
'X,' is recontextualized

and becomes more compelling.

Recontextualization arguably
myth. 9 0

is the defining feature of

The meaning of the form is only obscured, not

destroyed.

The "indisputable" image in Barthes words "is

tamed, put at a distance, made almost transparent; it
recedes a little, it becomes the accomplice of a concept
which corner to it fully armed." 91

Once subdued, the meaning

serves as a "reserve" for the form which

"must constantly

be able to be rooted again in the meaning and to get
what nature it needs for

its nutriment; above all

there

it must be

able to hide there. 96
With Barthes semiological explanation, the reason for
the revolution in 'X' may be lost, but form taps into the
atrocities of the revolt, violence and killings; into
that might have existed between the deposed

ties

'capitalists'

and U . S . administrations and those that might exist now
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between 'X' and other socialist countries.

These bring a

richness to the form of a government which is bent on
destruction of fundamental human rights as well as a
government which is against the U.S. society demonstrated by
the harm it imposed on its former leadership, friends of the
United States.

These meanings are absorbed within the

concept which replaces the distorted history with other
si tuations.
These situations are the "unlimited mass of signifiers"
that are available to the concept."

Countries 'Y' and 'Z,'

although ingrained in the archetype of 'socialism,' stand
alone or together as signifiers of the concept.

Other

revolutions, potential or actual, that are asserted to be
socialist inspired become signifiers—forms—within the
concept as well.

Likewise, stories once learned during

socialization, when recalled, add to the existing concept.
The result of meaning which is at once specified—
atrocities committed by socialist

'X'—and general—

socialism inspires revolution as in 'X,1 'Y,' and ' Z ' —
provides for the unification of the form with the conceptual
motivation producing "myth itself"—recontextualization.'"'
This occurs for two reasons.

First, literal meaning is

always present (the entity—socialist

'X') causing the

concept (defense, economic, and world peace) to be
established by an "eternal reference.'"3

Thus socialist

'X,' although highlighted as a revolutionary society that
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does harm to friends of the U.S., remains a physical polity
indicating a need for the United States to be aware of its
goals and to defend them.
long as 'X' exists.

The inclination will remain as

If in the case the country alters its

government to capitalism or is conquered, the polity's past
will exist as a historical example supporting the national
interests in perpetuity.
Second, American interests, the motivation for the
concept, are "frozen, purified, eternalized, made absent.96
Form exists as if it "naturally conjured up the concept" of
myth, "as if the signifier gave a foundation to the
signified."97
interests?

To paraphrase Barthes:
It's just a fact:

U.S. defense

look at 'X' which is just

like countries 'Y' and 'Z' who have threatened us in the
past!98

The specific intention is lost, and the

recontextualization takes on the quality of a mythic
generality, a unification of political form with the
American vision.
If the preceding description is accurate, it may serve
to explain why national myths historically as well as
currently have been and are credited with creating and
maintaining collective state belief, or consciousness.

For

instance, David Bidney writes that Neo-Platonic and Stoic
philosophers of the Hellenistic period "saw in it [myth] a
method of preserving the authority of tradition as well as
religious prerogatives of the state."99

Gilbert Morris
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Cuthbertson echoes Bidney's suggestion in his statement that
"Myths evoke the shared emotions of nationalism.

Myths

. .". create social cohesion and stimulate the social
consciousness of group politics."100
The unifying effect of myth perhaps can be attributed
to its commanding nature, which Barthes states "has an
imperative, buttonholing character:
stemming from an historical concept, directly
springing from contingency . . , it is I whom it
has come to seek. It is turned toward me, I am
subjected to its intentional force, it summons me
to receive its expansive ambiguity. . . . I feel
as if I were personally receiving an imperious
injunction. . . . This is because the concept
appears to me in all its appropriative nature: it
is a real call . . . .",01
Lasswell seemingly attests to this feature in his
observation that the "political myth which is accepted with
such confidence, is a configuration of assumptions (either
true or false) that they hardly appear to bear the character
of assumption."102
Besides functioning as a means of state support, mythic
recontextualization suggestibly could provide a description
of a United States' rhetoric of synnationalism and
ultimately may provide a clearer understanding of the state
vision.

Murray Edelman notes that people in collectives

have a propensity to "respond chiefly to symbols that
oversimplify and distort."103

A political

recontextualization operates as a symbol in that meaning is
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attached to a referential unit.

The recontextualization of

the referent makes this symbol comparable to what is termed
'key symbols' or 'condensation symbols."0''

No matter the

terminology, a political recontextualization functions to
unite the populace by promoting synnationalistic allegiance
to that symbol as long as the specificity of meaning is not
questioned.105

The rhetorically commanding effect of the

item for the mass public as Lasswell states "is that of
proviSding a common experience for everyone in the state":

Indeed, one of the few experiences that bind human
beings together, irrespective of race, region,
occupation, party, or religion, is exposure to the
same set of key words. Sentiments of loyalty
cluster around these terms, and contribute to the
unity of the commonwealth.104
Because of this impact and in light of the argument
that the United States vision shares similarities to
religious vision, a political recontextualization perhaps
could be explicated metaphorically.

More specifically,

foreign policy items with synnationalistic tendencies may
have the essence of a secular political icon, a rhetorical
icon, much like that of a religious icon of the Church.
George Galavaris posits the existence of secular icons that
personify the traditions of the state and have strong
moralizing characteristics.107

Furthermore, Herbert Read,

argues that icons, images projected through discourse, are
instrumental for the "development of human consciousness,
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and therefore in the development of the aptitudes and skills
dependent on consciousness."108

These analogous attributes

seemingly are present in political recontextualizations and
in their synnationalistic tendencies.
Aesthetic theory, while it is intended for and applies
directly to visual artifacts such as the religious icon,
may, as Edelman suggests, give insights into these
"expressive political symbols" of recontextual izat ion.109

As

Edelman states, both forms exist as a hermeneutic in which
"CpDsychological distance from symbols that evoke perception
and emotions heightens their potency rather than reducing it
. . . bringCingD out in concentrated form those particular
meanings and emotions which the members of a group create
and reinforce in each other.110
Aesthetic theory in general encompasses two
psychological functions of art:

vitalism and elevation.

The former stresses what is important while the latter lifts
art out of its "intentional purposiveness." M1
originates with vitalism.

Art

As an instrument of discourse,

art has never attempted to portray the entirety of the world
but only what is significant as a "life force."118

For

instance, during the Paleolithic Period typified by nomadic
tribes in which wild animals were important for survival,
the art form registered as animalism or animal art.

The

ancient tribal art found in caves of Southern France and
Northern Spain demonstrates significant patterns of animals'
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essential character.

As Read suggests, "the prehistoric

artist automatically emphasized what was most important in
the animal's form"—an enlarged head of a bull showing the
locale of the concentration of its power, for example."3
Likewise, a child's art exemplifies a vitalism.

Again, Read

states that a child "first scribbles aimlessly and then out
of the graphic chaos, begins to select and isolate
significant signs—signs for the objects nearest to his
vital needs."11*

In this case, the artistic function

manifests in representations of the mother, father,
siblings, self, and home.
Similarly, Christian art initially evidenced a
vitalism.

Unlike prehistoric and child's art, the function

of Christian art had a rhetorical function.

The motivation

was to provide the uninitiated as well as the illiterate
with pictorial narratives which could bring these
individuals to a state of grace important for the ultimate
survival of the individual — immortality.'15

The purpose of

early Christian art is observed by Ernst Kitzinger:
The artist's main interest is his story, he is
anxious to convey a definite message, and he
invites us to concentrate on this rather than on
details of form. In classical Cpagan3 works of
art, we always find a perfect balance between
content and form. The loss of this balance marks
a new stage in art-history, a stage in which art
becomes the vehicle for the propagation of certain
doctrines." 6
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Whereas vitalism suggests the purposiveness of form to
Christian art, the elevative function indicates a reason for
the overshadowing of intent by the form.

With elevation,

the motivation of form is displaced in that form in
actuality becomes simultaneously the thing signified.

Form

motivates form.
This phenomenon is seen in the iconizing of religious
art, which was more pronounced during the Byzantine Period.
Religious paintings during that era came to be regarded not
simply as illustrations for those who could not read or as
augmentations of the text for the literate few but as actual
truths within themselves." 7

The devotion attached to these

icons compelled the collective belief that these were "such
perfect symbols of the Holy Truth that there appeared to be
no need to ever depart from them."118
A political recontextualization experiences a similar
evolution from a position of vitalism to one of elevation.
Political form arguably has its origins in a sort of
vitalism.

Undoubtedly, the motivations for the form were or

were perceived to be real.

For example, the United States

was born in a threatening environment.
revolution.

It emerged from

Later, continent-wide trade had to be

instituted for economic solvency and survival.

A new order

was deemed essential to give stability to the system which
had experienced near disaster with the Articles of
Confederation.
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The unifying rubric of these motivations was the
immortality of the nation-state as was the narrative
motivation of Christian icons to the individual.

This

superlative force, therefore, would seemingly determine the
essential characteristics of United States political forms
as was the case in prehistoric and early Christian art.

As

in the latter, the motivation served as the guiding
principle behind form which educated and united the masses
within a collective consciousness.
But as Edelman observes of any symbolic form that
becomes a vehicle for expressing a group interest, political
form once descriptive becomes evocative.119

This

transformation can be explained potentially in terms of
aesthetic theory.

Vitalism expressed by an image is by

nature a recontextualization—significant features are
highlighted while others are

omitted.

This phenomena

registered in Byzantine art when, as noted in Kitzinger's
description, "all signs of individual life have been
suppressed, and faces and attitudes have become
stereotyped."160

Likewise, political form used to express

American foreign policy move from a position of vitalism to
one of elevation or evocation.

Kissinger apparently

describes this rhetorical feature of U.S. foreign policy
discourse when he states that issues are stated "in black
and white terms.

. . . Nations are

treated as similar

phenomena, and those states presenting immediate problem are
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treated simi larly. ",ei

Additionally, the incentive is extant

according to Kissinger to state "cases in its most extreme
form."166
The rationale for the evolution of political form to a
recontextualization is that this form, as Christian art,
provide the prerequisite to myth—abstracted meaning.

Both,

motivated by hidden concepts, become enduring, commanding a
type of encompassing piety, always ready to establish
mythical recontextualizations of a generalized immortality.
U.S. foreign policy discourse that is effective in
constructing popular opinion comparable to the artifact of
the Byzantine artist is a hermeneutic for a perceived
reality.,E3

The Byzantine artist provided the populace with

works, that rhetorically provided answers and means of
instruction and allowed a sense of participation in divine
life.

These symbols, when venerated, brought about

unification of the populace within a collective which was
administered by the Church."2*
American political forms when metaphorically iconized,
the tendencies suggested by synnationalistic discourse, also
provides answers and directions and suggest citizen
participation in the actions of the nation-state.

These

tendencies are achieved by advocates recontextualizing
foreign policy items as the nation-state vision.
forms, the

With these

foreign policy establishment is able to convince

the populace that proposed actions are in keeping with the
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interests of the nation-state vision.

The result is the

promise of a sort of immortality for the citizenry.

Thus,

in much the same way the Christian icon united the
terrestrial and celestial Church; a political
recontextualization can be viewed as a rhetorical icon that
persuades the populace to support the actions of its foreign
policy establish.1"
Of course, this analogy between the Christian icon and
what has been suggested as a rhetorical icon is deliberately
constructed for insights that it may give and is intended
only as a perspective from which to analyze foreign policy
discourse.

The Christian and rhetorical icons as abstract

ideal forms arguably have similar persuasive effects which
may be understood in their comparable designs.

However, in

practical applications, differences do exist which may cause
this analogy to break down.
While these may be numerous, two striking
dissimilarities should be noted.

First, an individual

interacts differently with the Christian icon than with the
rhetorical icon.

Christian icons were and are

artistic manifestations of religious belief.

actual
The religious

icon seemingly is approached naturally by the faithful as a
sacred object because of its explicit, more permanent,
visual religious context corresponding to the one already
internalized.

The rhetorical icon is more implicit.

This

political form, though artistic in nature, is a construct of
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discourse that assumes a type of religiosity.

The

sentimental attachments to the form are only as strong as
the temporal context its producing discourse constructs
within the psyche of the individual.
Second, the Christian icon, in its ideal state, had an
imperative nature while the same may not be always true of
the rhetorical icon.

The lack of technology during the

Byzantine era in which the religious form was conceived,
prevented alternate messages and channels of information.
The modern multiplicity of messages and channels, however,
may preclude the permanency of confidence placed in the
rhetorical icon.'"

Issues have the potential for creating

an awareness in the individual or groups of individuals that
due to their factional importance may challenge mass
confidence in the political form.

But not withstanding

these differences, this analogy may serve to explain why the
rhetorical icon, either in isolation or in their
configuration can serve to construct popular opinion.

Summary
This chapter proposes an analytic model for
understanding and evaluating foreign policy discourse.

It

posits the following stages in the construction of popular
opinion in terms of synnationalism.

First, the foreign

policy establishment constructs popular opinion through
discourse that has synnationalistic features.

These
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features can unify people because the nation-state vision
shares the abstract universal appeals of religious
discourse.

Second, the nation-state vision is constructed

from historically recycled discourse suggesting interests
important to the vision.

Finally, effective foreign policy

discourse recontextualizes policy items with those
interests.

Recontextualizing discourse constructs a

political form producing synnationalistic tendencies and in
so doing has the potential for constructing favorable
popular opinion.

In the next chapter, this model of

discourse analysis is expanded further and applied to the
Reagan Administration's handling of the 1986 Reykjavik
Meetings.
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CHAPTER III
AN APPLICATION OF THE SYNNATIONALISTIC MODEL
OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Although foreign policy may be guided by large
visionary goals, its day to day implementation occurs
through a concrete agenda of specific acts and policies.

It

is a rhetorical truism that abstract goals often enjoy far
broader support than the specific measures that are employed
to implement them.

This is because specific policies engage

real world constraints.

They may run up against the claims

of rival groups, the brute fact of limited resources, or the
tug of competing loyalties.
The United States foreign policy vision is implemented
through a finite set of agenda items.

This chapter examines

a central agenda item, the Strategic Defense Initiative.
The rhetorical trajectory by which public support was
constructed and mobilized in favor of this program is a
paradigm case of the foreign policy success formula.
Accordingly, in the first section of the chapter, the
agenda building process is analyzed.

Section two deals with

the ways in which constraints against public acceptance of
foreign policy are overcome.

The third section examines a

case history to discover how popular support was gained for
79
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a particularly controversial agenda item.

The final section

deals with the process of iconization as an ultimate aim of
agenda building.

This section includes an assessment of the

success of White House strategies in the construction of
popular opinion.

This occurred because the Administration

used synnationalistic discourse to recontextualize the
Strategic Defense Initiative as the American mission.

The

result was that S.D.I, became a commanding persuasive
symbol, a rhetorical icon, within the sphere of popular
opinion.

With this item, I will contend that the

Administration was able to redefine the Reykjavik meetings
from a conference on disarmament to an exemplum of the
'Peace Through Strength' doctrine.
I
The Agenda-Building Process of American Foreign Policy
The analysis of foreign policy discourse in this
chapter approaches American foreign policy from a systems
perspective.1

This systems context is consistent with what

is generally referred to as the 'policy' process.

Based on

their research, Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin make the
following three observations regarding policy: "1) Policy is
what the government says and does about perceived problems;
2) Policy making is how the government decides what will be
done about perceived problems; and 3) Policy making is a
process of interaction among governmental actors; policy is
the outcome of that interaction."6
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The systems perspective used for this analysis does not
view the United States has having multiple foreign policies.
Instead, U.S. foreign policy is considered to be one body
composed of many agenda items or issues.

These items are

implemented to advance the national interest in the
international arena.

Thus 'policy' in the context of this

discussion is considered to be the outcome of an agendabuilding process.

The sum-total of these varying issues

make-up U.S. foreign policy.
The process of agenda-building begins when a perceived
international exigence is brought to the national agenda.
While 'agenda' is often used to denote a prioritizing of
items, its application here, although it may include this
function, is intended as Roger Cobb and Charles Elder use
the term: "a general set of political controversies that
will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the
range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the
polity."3
This sphere of political concerns is divided into two
types, systemic and institutional.

The first type of agenda

"consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by
members of the political community as meriting public
attention and as involving matters within the legitimate
jurisdiction of existing governmental authority."''

The

second type, institutional or 'formal' agenda, is the "set

BE
of items explicitly up for the active and serious
consideration of authoritative decision makers."3
Cobb and Elder argue that the "natures of the two
agendas are substantially different."6

The systemic agenda

is "composed of fairly abstract and general items."

These

items "do little more than identify a problem area" and will
"not necessarily suggest either the alternatives available
or the means of coping with the problem."

The institutional

agenda is "more specific, concrete and limited in the number
of items."

This agenda identifies, "at least implicitly,

those facets of a problem that are to be seriously
considered by a decision-making body."
In the agenda-building process, an 'issue' moves from
the systemic to the institutional agenda.

As Cobb and Elder

suggest, "CI3t is unlikely that any issue involving
substantial social consequences will gain standing on a
governmental agenda unless it has first attained systemic
agenda status."7
For the issue to achieve recognition on the systemic
agenda, two factors must be present:

"initiator and the

event, or triggering mechanism, that transform the problem
into an issue."8

First, four classifications of initiators

are common in the agenda-setting process: "readjusters,"
"exploiters," "circumstantial reactors," and
"humanitarians."9
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The first type of initiator "perceiveUsII an unfavorable
bias in the distribution of positions or resources" and
constructs an issue to "redress this imbalance."10

The

World Zionist Organization, which was founded in 1897 and
coordinated programs to establish a national Jewish
homeland, might be seen as representative of this category.
The second type of initiator, 'exploiters,' includes
individuals or groups "who manufacture an issue for their
own gain."11

If the invasion of Grenada by the United

States in 1983 had been designed to foster favorable popular
opinion for Ronald Reagan a year before the presidential
election, the Administration arguably would be
representative of this classification.
'Circumstantial reactors,' the third type of initiator,
create issues in response to an unanticipated event.

The

freezing of Iranian assets by the Carter Administration in
response to the 1979 Hostage Crisis as well as the Bush
Administration's 1990-91 "Operation Desert Shield/Storm" in
reaction to the Iraqi take over of Kuwait are examples of
this type of initiator.
A final division is the 'humanitarian.'16

This

classification of initiator includes persons or groups who
bring an issue to the agenda to "acquire a psychological
sense of well-being for doing what they believe is in the
public interest."

This type of initiator is primarily

limited to domestic policy.

However an example of the
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humanitarian initiator in foreign policy includes musicians
under the leadership of Bob Geldof who with 'Live Aid'
raised money and created national awareness for the people
of drought-stricken Ethiopia during 1986.
The second factor that must be present for an issue to
achieve systemic agenda status is a triggering device.

Cobb

and Elder argue in foreign policy these triggering devices
are primarily external and include four types:
The first is an act of war or military violence
involving the United States as a direct combatant.
Examples include the Vietnam war, the Pueblo
seizure, and the dropping of atomic bombs on
Hiroshima. The second category includes
innovations in weapons technology involving such
things as arms control, the Hotline between the
Kremlin and the White House, and the deployment of
an anti-ballistic system The third type is an
international conflict in which the United States
is not a direct combatant, such as the conflicts
in the Middle East and the Congo. The final
category involves changing world alignment
patterns that may affect American membership in
the United Nations, troop commitments in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the American
role in the Organization of American States.13
Effective resolution of an exigence occurs when an item
is moved from recognition on the systemic agenda to popular
approval on the formal agenda.

This flight-path

necessitates a "dynamic interplay" between the initiator and
the trigger device.1*
popular opinion

This interplay must overcome three

constraints.

These constraints include:

1) Widespread attention or at least awareness; S) Shared
concern of a sizeable portion of the population that some
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type of action is required; and 3) A shared perception that
the matter is an appropriate concern of some governmental
unit and falls within the bounds of its authority.18

The

focus of this chapter now turns to the rhetorical means
utilized by the initiators to meet these constraints.
II
Rhetorical Means of the Systemic Agenda
Constraints facing an issue or item slated for the
systemic agenda arise through the situation consisting of
problem definition and efficacy of the solution.14

Problem

definition is fundamental due to the fact that societal
events are "interpreted in different ways by different
people at different times."17

The exigence must be

construed within limits that identify and specify interests
that induce majority agreement.
The second constraint, efficacy, exists due to the
abstract nature of policy and the operating presumptions of
foreign policy.

First, to gain support for an agenda item,

advocates should provide "good reasons" that an item will
effectively resolve the exigence and produce desireable
consequences.18

Meeting this aspect of the constraint is

problematic since systemic agenda items will have never been
tried and tested.

Thus, evidence given for the adoption of

an item will be tentative.

As many reasons for rejecting

the issue as those offered for its acceptance can be
expected.
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The policy establishment's belief that foreign policy
should be a 'closed' enterprise poses a second problem in
meeting this constraint.

Even if 'good reasons' were

available to argue the effectiveness of an item, foreign
policy practitioners hold to the tenet that secrecy should
be maintained, and the public should not be actively
involved."

Openly addressing this constraint would violate

this precept.
Because of the problems associated with the
definitional and efficacy constraints, specialized, or
technical, discourse in addressing them is not viable for
the construction of popular opinion.E0

Foreign policy

advocates meet the constraints facing an item on the
systemic agenda primarily by means of the special resources
of metaphoric discourse.

The utility of metaphoric foreign

policy discourse is threefold.

It addresses the abstract

situational constraints that otherwise might be lost by the
specialized language.

Second, it serves as a device for

explaining sensitive issues without revealing particular
details, thus maintaining secrecy.

Finally, it subdues

active involvement by the citizens in the process.
These functions are possible because of the metaphoric
tendencies of the discourse.

Ogden and Richards suggest

this discourse provides "context through other words."61
Furthermore, metaphoric discourse, as Murray Edelman argues,
allows the populace to "live in a world in which causes are
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simple and neat and remedies are apparent. "ee

The strength

of the device, according to Edelman, is that it "can
vividly, potently, pervasively evoke changed worlds in which
the remedies for anxieties are clearly perceived and self
serving causes of action are sanctified . "E3

The metaphor,

as "an instrument for shaping political support and
opposition and premises upon which decisions are made,"6" is
considered effective because it makes an image of the
"unclear and the remote."88
The effectiveness of the metaphoric language is
enhanced by the perceived role and situation of the
governmental and non-governmental actors bringing the item
to the attention of the general public.

The primary

governmental actor is historically and traditionally the
Office of the President.

The office entails a variety of

advisory and administrative agencies—the National Security
Council, the Cabinet, the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and agencies comprising the
'Intelligence Community' as well as other sources—that
assist agenda-setting."

Non-governmental policy advocates

are generally special interest groups comprised of economic
interest groups, the 'military-industrial complex' and
ethnic minorities.67
The administration capitalizes on the public's
perception of the constitutional roles inter alia of the
office as well as the situation.

Constitutional roles
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include Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat,
Commander in Chief and Chief Legislator.

Extra

constitutional roles encompass Chief of Party, Protector of
the Peace, Manager of Prosperity, World Leader, Voice of the
People, and Leader of the Rituals of American Democracy.EB
These roles augment the persuasibi1ity of the metaphoric
discourse by bringing a historic tradition of credibility to
it.E9
For the most part, special interest groups do not have
the benefit of pre-legi t imized roles.30

Therefore, these

groups primarily use the situation of the exigence.

An

example of such an agenda-setting effort was that of the
American Jewish Conference, which existed from 1942-48.
During its six year existence, the lobby brought to the U.S.
agenda the need for a Jewish Homeland, the State of Israel.
The group was effectively able to use the situation of the
Jewish Holocaust to support one truism of their campaign
that:

"Israel is historic justice and serves as just

compensation for innumeral massacres."31
Role and situation are not only important in terms of
providing plausibility.

These create another indispensable

asset to the advocates—power to gain access to the media in
order to voice their cause.ae

Presumably, advocates can

hold three classes of power that are influential in gaining
access to the media.

First is what Dan Nimmo and James

Combs define as a sort of 'celebrity' power .a3 This power
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can be described as a presumed noteworthiness of individuals
because of wealth, occupation, or prestige that draws
attention of the media.

Elected officials, particularly the

President, would best exemplify advocates possessing this
faculty.

Because of the actual and perceived roles of

office, elected officials are able to direct media attention
to an issue.

For instance, Robert MacNeil of the nationally

acclaimed PBS MacNei1/Lehrer News Hours admitted a "certain
amount of truth" in the proposition that the media is
"slavish to the [presidential3 administration."3*

MacNeil

stated "where the administration turns its searchlight or
its spotlight, we [the mediaD tend to follow more than we do
other things.

We follow the lead of the administration

first."35
A second class of media related power held by advocates
can be identified as 'melodramatic.'

Melodramatic power is

the capability to influence the media due to a heightened
piteousness or compassionate emotionalism in response to
circumstance.

As Nimmo and Combs argue, "Occasionally

things happen that are so fantastic, involve remarkable
characters, are vastly panoramic in scope, and prove so
interesting to the audience" that the media construct a
melodrama.36

This melodrama "typically involves a moral

tale of the struggle of morality versus immorality and
satisfies mass-audience desire for both thrilling and
sensational fare combined with some sort of affirmation that
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evil is punished and that morality is vindicated."37

As an

actor in the melodrama, an advocate, either in the role of
hero or victim, is able to express the issue that caused or
might prevent the evil.
Again, the American Jewish Conference may typify such
an advocate.

Immediately before and after the surrender of

Nazi Germany, accounts surfaced concerning the atrocities
committed against individuals of Jewish descent.

Those

reports placed the Jewish Conference in the position of
victim in the melodrama covered by the media.

Arguably, by

using that media position, the Conference became
instrumental in having the State of Israel formalized on the
U.S. agenda immediately following the creation of the
state.38
A final classification of power providing accessibility
to the media could be considered a combination of both
celebrity and melodramatic power.

This power is derived

from the identification of primary advocates with others
whom Cobb and Elder delineate as "specific publics"
including "identification" and "attention" groups.39
Identification groups are those individuals who would
identify "generally" their interests or have a "persistent
sympathy with . . . Ethel generic interests of another
group."*0

An example of such a group is the 'Christian

Right,' which has strong emotional attachments to the issues
of pro-Israeli advocates.

The religious collective is
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characterized by its profound belief in the inerrancy of
biblical scriptures.

According to their interpretations,

the State of Israel is mandatory.

For the 'Second Coming'

to occur, the Jews must be gathered in the Holy L a n d — a
State of Israel.41
Pro-Israel advocates nurture the support of the
Christian Right which has an estimated membership between
thirty to fifty million people.

These advocates stress

biblical morality as a "valid basis" for the "utmost in
financial and military support to Israel.'"18

Any U.S.

agenda item unfavorable to Israel threatens its security,
and as one member of this identification group is reported
to have observed, "If Israel does not survive, there is no
place for Jesus to come back to."*3
Attention groups are a second classification for
individuals comprising specific publics.

Although these

individuals are "disinterested in most issues, . . . they
are informed about and interested in certain specific
issues.

. . . CODnce an issue is raised in their sphere of

concern, they become readily mobi 1 izable. "** Again, an
example of these groups can be seen in the context of the
Israeli issue.

To maintain a favorable U.S. position, pro-

Israel advocates promote a bond between the State of Israel
and its citizens and the American Jewish community.

They

appeal to the belief that Jews "denote a transnational,

9a
multilingual, historical and religious group which professes
a oneness, a unity, a whole, a solidarity.""
Advocates attempt to convince the American Jewish
community of a 'partnership' among all Jews.

The American

Jew has an obligation to support pro-Israeli issues.

This

tendency constructed from the alliance is discernable in a
statement attributed to a U.S. Jewish theologian and
political activist that:

"We [members of the American

Jewish community] have as much interest in fostering Israel
as do Blacks in eliminating the ghettos or union members in
maintaining the integrity of the unions."*6
These groups gain access to the media because many
individuals within the specific publics have celebrity
status such as television evangelists.

But more important,

they gain the attention of the media due to their potential
impact on U.S. decision-making and the electorial process.
As Gerard A. Hauser contends, they "may vote and shout . . .
they shove and claim."*'
"ejaculate."*8

In Hauser ' s words, they

Thus their access to the media would fulfill

the melodramatic interest of the media.
Cobb and Elder point out "for an item or an issue to
acquire popular recognition, its supporters must have either
access to the mass media or the resources necessary to reach
people."*9

Role and situation serve to accomplish both

functions.

By using role and situation, the advocates

reinforce the metaphoric discourse with credibility allowing
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for the personification and mandate of the issues that they
support.
This description suggests the limitations of public
participation in foreign policy.

The discourse of that

policy, because of its metaphoric nature, provides only an
illusionary understanding of items.

In this platonic

process, citizens respond to "objects of belief and not of
knowledge."30

Foreign policy decisions are limited to a

foreign policy establishment similar to what Plato described
as 'guardians' or 'oligarchs.'

The result is what Kenneth

Zagacki and Andrew King describe as a "further
fragmentation" of a "delegitimizing tendency" in American
political discourse."

The people "become little more than

spectators. "31
By analyzing U.S. foreign policy discourse, the
possibility exists that public participation in decisionmaking may be eventually enhanced.

Findings from these

analyses, as Habermas suggests, perhaps may "make it
possible to distinguish an accord or agreement among free
and equals from a contingent or forced consensus. "se

In the

next two sections of this chapter such an analysis is
attempted.

The undertaking, hopefully, will show in a

specific case, the aftermath of the Reagan-Gorbachev
Reykjavik Meetings, the operation of the rhetorical means of
the systemic agenda and particularly how advocates
constructed popular opinion through the use of
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synnationalistic rhetoric.

In the first section, the

background of the event is discussed.
Ill
A Case Study in Systemic Agenda Access
At meetings held in Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11-12,
1986, President Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev
worked out a "series of accords in principle that surprised
the negotiators themselves."33
included:

The tentative agreements

1) the banning of all medium-range missiles from

Europe; S) the initiation of a phased accord beginning with
verification of existing treaties with the ultimate goal of
the cessation of nuclear testing; 3) a limitation of nuclear
launchers, missiles and bombers, and the abolition of all
ballistic missiles over ten years; and 4) "an agreed
statement" concerning separated families, emigration and
possible areas of cooperation.3*
The series of talks, which might have produced
"'historic gains'. . . foundered on" President Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative.83

During the meetings' final

day, Mikhail Gorbachev linked all agreements to an
"'integral part' of the package—that the 1972 antibal1istic
missile treaty be made binding for ten more years and that
this be understood to restrict research and testing on new
missile defense to the laboratory.""

Reagan's rejection of

the linkage not to curb the initiative led to the
culmination of the two day meetings with a failure to reach
agreement.
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The outcome of the Reykjavik meetings created a
threefold domestic problem for the Reagan Administration
including:

1) negative impacts on upcoming congressional

elections; 2) a questionable future for the Strategic
Defense Initiative as a viable policy item; and 3) a
possible deterioration of the Reagan Administration legacy.
First, the Reykjavik meetings had the potential to result in
Republican losses in the November congressional elections.
Holloway and George assert political activity of citizens
cluster around several concerns that focus "on standards of
living, health, and the prospects for their children,
including their education and opportunity of
advancement."87
factors.

Voting can be affected by threats to these

If emotional arguments were constructed by the

Democratic party that Reagan had created an unstable
environment, and if these were accepted by the majority of
citizens, Republicans, in general, could have been held
accountable for a "major conflict" that could jeopardize
everything" that the people "might hope for."38
The situation was ripe for such a charge.

The Soviet

Union's arrest of U.S. journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, as
well as the U.S. expulsion of Soviet diplomatic personnel
during September and October of 1986 suggested a growing
conflict between the two superpowers.39

In light of this

situation, the Administration faced a recycled Democratic
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accusation that the Reagan Administration was responsible
for tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Although defeated earlier, this allegation would be
harder to overcome in the wake of Reykjavik.

Reagan

initially began his term in office with what some experts
had called a "benign neglect" toward arms control in which
American-Soviet relations were allowed "to reach a twentyyear low."60

The Administration in its first four years

advocated containment of the 'Evil Empire' through U.S.
rearmament with an average defense budget increase of eight
point three percent leading to a proposed three hundred
thirteen billion dollar defense budget for the first year of
the second term.*1

This militarization posture kept alive

the charge first levied in 1980 by the Democrats that Reagan
was "trigger happy" and citizens' anxieties concerning
Reagan's "warmonger image."62
The Administration dispelled that accusation and
relieved public fear by advancing the posture as 'Peace
Through Strength.'63

The goal of rearmament was justified

as a "bargaining chip" to secure negotiations with the
Soviet Union for arms reductions.6*

For instance, this

justification, as Andrew King and Kenneth Petress write, was
used by the Reagan White House to defuse the U.S. Nuclear
Freeze Movement of 19B1-8S.6S

King and Petress argue that

Reagan was able to defeat the movement in part by convincing
the American people that it was not a "universal movement,
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but a unilateral Western Movement with no counterpart in the
Soviet Union."66
By rejecting Sorbechev's overtures, Reagan potentially
threatened his justification for the U.S. build-up of
conventional and nuclear weapons.

Sorbachev's proposals

could have been interpreted as the beginning of Soviet
attempts at arms reductions countering the unilateral
argument.

If Reagan's justification were lost, popular

opinion might have been convinced by arguments similar to
that of Tom Wicker who alleged that the President "missed
the best chance any President has had in the last two
decades to eliminate the central security concern" of the
United States.67

But even more detrimental, the

Administration could have been labeled as the aggressor in
the American-Soviet conflict by Reagan's refusal to
negotiate.

The President could have been perceived as

escalating existing tensions between the United States and
the Soviets.

The perception persisting from October until

November had the potential to result in the loss of critical
Republican House and Senate seats.
Second, the failed Reykjavik meetings threatened the
Administration with the possible rejection of the Strategic
Defense Initiative as a viable policy instrument or with a
reduction of funding.

The initiative received sharp

criticisms following the meetings.

Although the

Administration described S.D.I, from its inception as the
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solution to the Soviet problem, critics charged that the
instrument, dubbed 'Star Wars' by the media, was little more
than a whim.68

For instance, nuclear physicist, I. A.

Robbie, who worked on the Manhattan Project during World War
II, argued that S.D.I, was a "foolish" project "of an old
man."

As Robbie stated, "Think about the arrogance . . .

he

CReaganD knows nothing about this" but announces the project
to the world "before he consults the scientists."4*

Others

argued even if deployment were feasible, the project would
cost a "trillion or more dollars," would take a decade to
deploy and ultimately would lead to the militarization of
space by the superpowers.70
Reagan's failure to negotiate the reduction of existing
military technology due to Soviet demands placed on the nonexisting weapons system resulted in other charges.

For

instance, Reagan was accused of "protectCingD a research
program in which some of the most distinguished American
scientists have no faith, and for which the necessary
computers and software do not and may never exist."71
Furthermore, critics challenged the effects to the program
resulting from limitations demanded by the Soviets in
exchange for the arms reduction agreement.

Opponents argued

that the condition of confining S.D.I, research to the
laboratory, "would have no significant effect" on the
project.

Some critics even alleged that the limitation

"might speed technical progress if showy demonstrations in

99
orbit were foregone for more exacting ones on earth."76

If

a convincing case had been made from these arguments,
popular opinion could have rejected the initiative or
supported a reduction of its funding.73
More important than loss of S.D.I.'s funding were the
long term impacts that arguments arising from Reykjavik
might have on the Reagan legacy.

Reagan could be faulted as

a dogmatic President who refused to sacrifice a "dubious
vision" for the security of the United States.7"

If this

occurred, future attempts to block the Administration agenda
would be supported by popular opinion.

In such a case, the

Executive would become ineffectual as an agenda-setter for
both foreign and domestic policy.

The Reagan White House

would risk being regarded as extremist and as impotent in
policy matters.

Conceivably, the Republican Party could

receive the blunt from this negative legacy of its standard
bearer.

The party could be linked to the Administration's

negative record, losing policy decisions and other
elections.
Three days following the meetings, however, the Reagan
Administration was able to effectively construct popular
opinion that supported its actions at Reykjavik.

In so

doing, the Administration resolved the potential tripartite
domestic problem created by the meetings.

For instance,

despite the rhetoricity of the questions, a White House poll
conducted on October 14th, two days following the meetings,
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gave an indication that "overall [popular] approval of . . .
Reagan's handling of his job had jumped from sixty-four
percent among one thousand people interviewed October ninth
and tenth, to seventy-three percent among five hundred
interviewed . "75
Findings from the White House poll were supported by a
Times/CBS News Poll taken on October 14th and 15th.

The

survey suggested that in "almost all population groups"
questioned, including Democrat as well as Republican
respondents, "more than twice as many blamed Mr. Gorbachev
as blamed the President for the lack of agreement in
Reykjavik. "7A
This positive perception occurred because the White
House met the rhetorical problem created by the Reykjavik
meetings.

The rhetorical problem facing the Administration

was the "initial assessment that the meetings had broken
down in anger, that arms control prospects had dimmed and
that United States-Soviet relations were off-course.""
When the meetings stalemated, Reagan was described as
"grim-faced, even angry."78

A key official in the

Administration was quoted as saying:
just furious.

"The President was

He was steaming angry when he came out of

that door with Gorbachev.

We all felt that we had come so

close to pulling this off, and yet we couldn't."79
One official described Secretary of State George Shultz
"as looking haggard and drained" when he delivered a
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nationally televised press conference the day the meeting
ended.80

In that description, the official is reported to

have said that he had "never seen Shultz exude through his
word, the pace of his comments, his facial expressions, such
disappointment and defeat."81

The Administration's

frustration registered in Shultz's conclusion to his opening
remarks when he told the American people that the White
House was "deeply disappointed at this outcome."86
The change in perception occurred because the
Administration was able to redefine the Reykjavik meetings.
That redefinition hinged on the White House's ability to
market an agenda item.

While the rhetorical problem arose

from the collapse of the Reykjavik meetings, the breakdown
producing the problem was attributed to a Reagan agenda
instrument.

The President had refused to consider

limitations on his Strategic Defense Initiative, which was a
component of 'Peace Through Strength.'

Therefore the sine

qua non of a Reykjavik redefinition depended on constructing
popular support for the agenda item.
The Administration accomplished this by:

1) using

rhetorical strategies to construct popular support for the
'Peace Through Strength' posture, particularly the Strategic
Defense Initiative on the systemic agenda; and 2) using that
endorsement to change the image of the meetings.

The

suggestion that popular opinion construction occurred at the
systemic level of the agenda process is based on Cobb and

108
Elder's argument that formalized issues take a long time in
achieving that status.83

If Cobb and Elder are correct, a

reasonable assumption is that 'Peace Through Strength' and
S.D.I, had never reached the formal agenda.
The Reagan Administration began its first term with
expressed concern over domestic spending with defense
receiving little emphasis.

The White House began to set a

defense agenda for increased spending by the 1988 mid-term
elections.

However, in March of 1983, Administration

defense spending requests were being seriously questioned by
both Democrats and Republicans.6'' The 'bargaining chip'
basis for the expenditures additionally raised doubt in
November of that year when the Soviets walked out of medium
range nuclear missile negotiating sessions over the issue of
U.S. deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in
Western Europe.85
By the beginning of the second Reagan term in 1985, the
defense budget was coming under "especially close
scrutiny."86

Foreign policy instruments, including both the

MX missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative, the latter
being in the planning stage, were threatened with budgetary
extinction.

Even though the White House had pushed for

approval of the defense agenda as part of the formal agenda
as early as 198S, popular support for the items was not
strong enough in 1986 for necessary institutional status.
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The potential for a negative popular opinion created by
Reykjavik further impacted the status of the Reagan
Strategic Defense Initiative.

For instance, the ranking

Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Clairborne Pell was quoted as saying:
This is a sad day for mankind. I deeply
regret the failure to achieve an agreement when we
were virtually on its brink. As I said a year
ago, the obvious compromise was, is and will be, a
deep reduction in strategic offensive weapons in
exchange for an equivalent limitation on the
Strategic Defense Initiative."
In essence we have given up a bird in the
hand, for two in the bush, S.D.I.87
The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee asserted
that Congress "would put Star Wars under more scrutiny and
fire than ever before."88
Subsequently, at the time of the Reykjavik meetings,
the three constraints necessary for formal agenda status of
Reagan's defense agenda had never been met.

The White House

had not effectively acquired a mass public acceptance of
'Peace Through Strength' and
appropriate.

S.D.I, as being needed and

The concern triggered by Reykjavik over

Reagan's policy issues demanded a re-emergence and/or
renewal of these items at the systemic level.
Based on this assumption, the Reagan Administration can
be viewed as 'circumstantial reactor' as well as 'exploiter'
initiators for revitalizing its defense agenda.

The

unexpected Reykjavik situation necessitated the first

10<t
initiator role.

The belief reportedly held by the

Administration prior to the meetings was that Reykjavik
would serve only as a preliminary for scheduling a 1987
summit in the United States between Gorbachev and Reagan.
The meetings were not for purposes of actual proposal
negot iations.
Since the meetings were considered of limited
consequence, the talks were hastily planned.

White House

Chief of Staff, Donald T. Regan recalled that on September
19, 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
delivered a letter to President Reagan from Gorbachev
proposing a meeting "as soon as possible" between the two
leaders for purposes of discussing the complete elimination
of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles from
Europe.

This itinerary was expanded to include discussions

pertaining to human rights violations, regional conflicts,
and bilateral relations.89

On September 30, Reagan

publicly announced the Iceland meetings slated to begin
eleven days later.

Because of Administration skepticism

concerning the meetings' outcome, the President concentrated
on other governmental matters during that time.

His

Reykjavik preparations were limited to briefings by advisors
and to carrying "homework" to the presidential quarters of
the White House.90
Reports from Iceland indicated the Administration was
surprised by the proposals Gorbachev brought to the series
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of talks."

According to one official, Reagan at one point

told his U.S. delegation:
summit.

"This wasn't supposed to be a

We aren't supposed to be in these negotiations.*6

In the aftermath of Reykjavik, the Administration had
to address charges that the meetings' failure was due to the
White House's extreme haste and poor preparedness.

Former

Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations, Robert McNamara, assessed the meetings as
"ill-planned."93

Although McNamara gave the President

"tremendous credit for the imagination and courage with
which he presented his ideas," he argued the "matter had not
been thought through by our government.
discussed with our Joint Chiefs.

It hadn't been

It hadn't been discussed

with our allies.""' The situation mandated that the
Administration dodge any indication the "American side got
into areas that had not been thoroughly prepared for
beforehand. "9S
The Administration performed the second role,
exploiter, due to the possibility of Reykjavik's political
ramifications.

Political fall-out from the meetings

apparently seemed real for the Administration as well as
others vying internally and externally for political gain.
Within the U.S. campaign arena, reports being circulated
suggested that Democratic hopes of a November victory had
been heightened, and Republican expectations had been
"dashed" by the meetings' lack of positive closure."
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The Soviet Union stood to profit politically from the
meetings' collapse, as well.

Senior Soviet officials,

"including advisers to Mr. Gorbachev from the Government and
Party, several of them members of the Central Committee,"
reportedly claimed that if "a convincing case" could be made
that "Reagan blocked a chance to curtail the arms race by
insisting on continued development of a space-based missile
defense system," the USSR could achieve a two-fold public
relations victory.97

According to the officials, the Soviet

Union could influence the outcome of critical November
elections and, more importantly, could make "inroads in
Western Europe," weakening the NATO Alliance.98

Both of

these public relation attempts were apparent at a press
conference held by Soviet Leader Gorbachev on his departure
from Reykjavik:

I think you are here representing the people
of the world and you know that the world is in
turmoil. The world is concerned. The world
demands leaders of the Soviet Union and the United
States display political will, display
determination to stop the trends that are leading
towards dangerous and unpredictable consequences.
. . .1 feel the President probably would have to
seek the advice of Congress, of American political
leaders, of the American Public. Let America
think. We are waiting. We are not withdrawing
the proposals that we have put forward and I would
say the proposals on which, substantially, we have
agreed.
Now secondly, I think that all realistically
minded forces in the world should now begin to
act.99
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Unless the perception were changed, the failed
Reykjavik meetings would represent a potential political
weapon against the Administration and the Republican Party.
The Administration was placed therefore in a position of
having to exploit rhetorically for its advantage the
unexpected events of Reykjavik brought on by its agenda
item.
Aboard Air Force One from Iceland to Andrews Air Force
Base, hours following Shultz's press conference and a
nationally televised departure address by Reagan, the White
House developed a two part strategy for addressing the
rhetorical problem of Reykjavik.100

The program reportedly

was described by Patrick J. Buchanan, Director of White
House Communications, as "the most extensive and intensive
communications plan" that he had "ever been associated with
in the White House.'"01

The campaign's purpose was to

deliver to the American people a message concerning
Reykjavik favorable to the Administration.
The first part of the campaign was to capitalize on the
melodrama of the Reykjavik meetings to gain access for
spokespersons approved by the Administrat ion .,0E

By doing

this, the Administration attempted what U.P.I. Bureau Chief,
Helen Thomas, noted 'dean' of the White House Press Corp
alleges is the aim of all administrations—to provide "snap
shots" of information that administrations treat as "their
private preserve."

According to Thomas, "The White House
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doesn't want us to ask questions.

They want us to see only

what they want us to see.'"03
Donald T. Regan, the White House Chief of Staff, in his
decision "to place major Administration officials on the
record before virtually any television, newspaper, magazine
or radio outlet that asked for them" could provide its
version of Reykjavik as the authoritative one and perhaps
keep the drama of Reykjavik alive until a favorable popular
opinion could be constructed.10*

All White House officials

involved in the campaign were to speak "on the record and by
name attached to the individual talking."105

Larry Speaks,

White House spokesman, told reporters, "If you receive
information on a background basis from a senior
Administration official, from here on out that senior
Administration official may not be plugged into what's going
on. "10*
The public relations campaign began on October 13th,
the day following the close of the meetings with NATO
members being briefed by Secretary of State Shultz and a
nationally televised address by Ronald Reagan.107

By October

l^tth, the public relations campaign had been transformed
into a "full-blown publicity blitz."108

For instance,

President Reagan "spent almost" the entire day of October
l^th discussing the Iceland meetings with congressional
leaders, newspaper columnists and television news anchors,
and foreign policy and national security officials.

On
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October 13th and 14th, the schedules of the Secretary of
State and John T. Poindexter, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, "focused on the summit."

Their coast-to-

coast activities included appearances on televised news
programs, meetings with newspaper editors and reporters, and
news conferences.'09
The second component of the White House strategy was to
provide the American public with a consistent suasory
message that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a
necessary agenda item.

In light of this assessment,

Reagan's refusal to sacrifice S.D.I, would be a fitting
response.

Reykjavik would be a success.

Buchanan was

quoted as saying:
From the early instant analysis, all you got was
that the summit collapsed because the President
was intransigent on S.D.I. That's simplistic and
false. We have the whole story. So Regan,
Shultz, Poindexter, and the President a,rs going on
the record in as many forums as we can to tell the
story.110
The message constructed by the Administration followed
the positive thematic parameter used by Shultz in his
Reykjavik press conference and Reagan's nationally televised
departure address delivered at Keflavik, Iceland.111

This

theme arguably was followed because it was already in the
public domain, but more importantly, the theme assimilated
the events of Reykjavik into Reagan's established persona.112

no
Supporters and even more objective political analysts
suggest that the popular appeal of Reagan resided in his
image.

For instance, James Brady, Reagan's White House

Press Secretary, writes that Reagan was able to "flourish"
as the "Great Communicator" because the "man and the
President" were "inseparable."

He conducted "his presidency

based on the same fundamental principles that . . . guided
his life."113

Likewise, Hedrick Smith argues Reagan's

appeal "had ridden on image:

his image of steadfastness,

his image as a man of principle, his image of uncompromising
refusal to deal with the devil."1'*
By recycling this theme in the redefinition of
Reykjavik, the Administration provided narrative rationality
to its message.

According to Walter Fisher, this quality

can determine "whether or not one 'should' accept a story,
whether or not a story is indeed trustworthy and
reliable."" 5

The resulting appeal of the Administration's

message, therefore, can be credited to the Reagan persona,
"his character, his commitment to his philosophy . . . , and
the coherence of his position," much as Fisher explains the
allure of Socrates' story told in the Sorqias.116
In their statements, Reagan and Shultz embraced the
President's persona suggesting the noble resolve of the
Administration as opposed to the ignoble motive of the
Soviets.

Reagan was portrayed as a hard working negotiator

who went to Iceland "to advance the cause of peace" and who
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"put on the table the most far-reaching arms-control
proposals in history."

As Shultz described, Reagan "was

constructive in reaching out and using his creativity and
ingenuity."

Further, Shultz argued the President was

willing to make concessions.

But at the same time, he

"would not turn away from the basic security interests of
the United States, or allies and the free world."
This motive was contrasted with the negative Soviet
intent that "rejected" the noble cause.

The difference

manifested by Soviet limitations on S.D.I.

Shultz described

the Strategic Defense Initiative as having "the nature of an
insurance policy—insurance against cheating, insurance
against somebody getting hold of these weapons."

S.D.I,

would "maintain an effective shield for the United States,
for our allies, for the free world."

Soviet attempts to

link the proposals to the initiative, which Reagan professed
as a "defensive shield," were described by Shultz as
"perhaps a indication of where they're headed."
White House officials built upon this theme during the
massive public relations campaign constructing a three part
scenario of Reykjavik that:

1) contraposed the American

with the Soviet motive; S) suggested how the American motive
overcame the U.S.S.R's; and 3) proposed the benefits of
Reykjavik.

First, the Soviet Union was represented as

having initiated the Reykjavik meetings with a "letter from
the General Secretary saying, "Please come meet me in
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Iceland."117

Even though most of his advisors saw the risks

involved, Reagan, "felt it was important to try."

At the

talks, Reagan was willing to negotiate and to make
concessions in areas "important to the United States and our
allies. "1,B
The Soviet motive for instigating the negotiating
process was an attempt to accomplish what its 1983 walk-out
of the Geneva negotiations sessions had failed to do, to
weaken support for Reagan's defense agenda.

The

Administration argued that from the time the Soviet
delegation had walked out of the Geneva arms reduction talks
until Gorbachev contacted Reagan, the U.S.S.R. had been
testing American determination and challenging NATO's
accord.

But during the course of the "year and a half when

they walked out of the talks," IMf missiles were deployed in
Europe with the approval of European allies as the North
Atlantic Alliance had became more united.119

Soviet

participation in the Reykjavik meetings ultimately was
designed to bring about reductions in 'Peace Through
Strength' and "kill" S.D.I.160
If and when that plan failed and the meetings
deadlocked, the Soviets would then use propaganda that would
eventually force American arms reduction.

Paul Nitze,

Special Presidential Advisor on Arms Control, argued that
the Soviets intended to use the lack of final conclusion at
the summit as a means for "creating divisions between the
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United States and . . . Cits3 various allies around the
world and within the various countries including the United
States as well."161
Second, according to the Administration's scenario,
Reagan's resolve halted this Soviet attempt.

Reagan stated

that he entered into the negotiations with "no illusions
about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions.

We were

publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions
between totalitarianism and democracy."188

Reagan observed,

"the principal objective of American foreign policy" is "not
just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom" and
a "commitment to the growth of democratic government and
democratic institutions around the world."

These two goals

were protected by Reagan.
Reagan argued that during the meetings he proposed "the
most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history.
. . . EHeD offered the complete elimination of all ballistic
missiles—Soviet and American—from the face of the earth by
1996. "iaa

Furthermore, Reagan "didn't limit Cthe

negotiations] to just arms reductions.

. . . CHe3 discussed

. . . violation of human rights on the part of the
Soviets. "
The perseverance of the presidency was tested by unfair
Soviet demands placed on the American proposals:
This may have been the most sweeping and
important arms reduction proposal in the history
of the world. But it wasn't good enough for Mr.
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Gorbachev. He wanted more. He wanted us to
accept even tighter limits on S.D.I, than the ABM
treaty now requires. That is to stop all but
laboratory research. He knew this meant killing
the Strategic Defense Initiative entirely, which
has been the Soviet goal from the start.
Of course, the Soviet Union has long been
engaged in extensive strategic defense programs of
its own. And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes
well beyond research—even to deployment. The
Soviet proposal would have given them an immediate
one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. I could
not and would not agree to that. I won't settle
for anything unless it's in the interest of
American Secur i ty .,e*
Reagan, who professed that he preferred "no agreement
than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States,"
rejected the linkage alleging that "CwDhat Mr. Gorbachev was
demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a
new version of a fourteen year-old ABM treaty that the
Soviet Union has already violated.

. . . CHeD told him we

don't make those kinds of deals in the United States:
I told him I had pledged to the American people
that I would not trade away S.D.I.—there was no
way I could tell our people their government would
not protect them against nuclear destruction. I
went to Reykjavik determined that everything was
negotiable except two things our freedom and our
future. 1 "
By constructing this narrative of the President
standing up to the Soviet Union, the Administration drew
from the consistency of a forty year Cold War consensus that
a strong U.S. diplomacy is the best defense against
Communism.

This Kennan philosophy demands a pragmatic and

"hardheaded handling of a rigorously appraised situation
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. . . not to make the world wonderful but to save it from
the worst consequences of its follies" 166 :
Russians will pursue a flexible policy of
piecemeal presumption and encroachment of other
people's interest, hoping that no single action
will appear important enough to produce a strong
reaction on the part of their opponents, and that
in this way they may gradually bring about a major
improvement in their position before the other
fellow knows what's up. . . . Whoever deals with
them must therefore be sure to maintain at all
times an attitude of decisiveness and alertness in
the defense of his own interests ,,e7
In keeping with this philosophy, the Secretary of State
observed that he thought "it was good for the Soviets to see
that in Ronald Reagan they are up against somebody who is
capable of saying

'no' as well as capable of saying 'yes,'

who will judge the interests of the United States and hold
firm for them."1EB

Buchanan echoed this popular sentiment

that "CwDhen the President of the United States stands up
for the national security of this country and takes that
kind of firestorm, I think that the average American will
say, 'I trust Ronald Reagan.

He did the right thing in the

national security interest.' "le,
The final component of the White House scenario was
Reykjavik's impact on the substance and direction of future
negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the
aftermath of the meetings.

This element of the scenario

attempted to dispel the image constructed by the media that
the negotiations had failed.

The Administration attempted
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to construct a rival narrative that the meetings had laid
the foundation for future meetings.
Again, this strategy followed the Kennan thought.

The

narrative suggested by the Administration assumes the
U.S.S.R. will negotiate when "they themselves want something
and feel themselves in a dependent position."130

For

instance, Buchanan challenged the media's report by arguing
that they "went into something . . .

of a collective panic

in their descriptions" of a "col lapse. ",31

Although, he

admitted that Gorbachev "was very tough in his statement,"
Buchanan stressed that Gorbachev "didn't say 'I'm never
going to the United States to a summit.'"
This observation augmented Reagan's position that:
"The United States put good, fair ideas out on the table
. . . CthatH won't go away.
their own."13E

Good ideas . . . have a life of

This contention was supported by other White

House officials who argued that the importance of the
meetings was "the substance of what is possible. "l3a
The outcome of this scenario was a redefinition of the
Reykjavik meetings.

Secretary of State Shultz appraised the

meetings as "not a question of how it appears, it's a matter
of what happened:
Now the strategic nuclear weapons are more
numerous and more deadly and of course they're
pointed at the United States so we went to
Reykjavik very much in mind willing to engage on
that subject. And as it turned out, we were able
to. And we were able to bring off an agreement
with Mr. Gorbachev contingent, to be sure, but,
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nevertheless, to nail down a cutting in half of
those weapons and to do it in a manner that makes
sense from our standpoint. That is category by
category. . . .
And so as we have assessed it, and others
have. We have said, "Now look at these
accomp 1 ishments . ",3*
For this assessment of Reykjavik to 'work,' popular
opinion had to find Administration statements credible that
the United States needed the Strategic Defense Initiative.
After all, the failure to reach positive closure making the
'possibilities' of Reykjavik

'contingent' rather than a

reality resulted from Reagan's refusal to sacrifice his
'vision.'
The White House seemed to be facing a rhetorical
dilemma.

On one hand, the Administration was publicly

advocating that the "supreme need . . .

is for man to learn

to live together in peace and harmony . . . where peace
reigns and freedom is enshr ined. "l3a

But at the same time,

the Administration was advocating its defense agenda that
entailed the rebuilding of the U.S. military.i3A

Without an

element bolstering these agenda items, particularly S.D.I.,
the resolve of the President and his commitment to the
nonexistent weapons system, might have appeared absurd.
Soviet demands could have seemed reasonable.

Ultimately, a

redefinition of Reykjavik would be more difficult if not
impossible.
To persuade the American people of S.D.I.'s viability,
the Administration used arguments that previously had been
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used to gain support for the agenda item and buttressed
these with new arguments derived from the situation.
First, the White House followed a similar strategy for the
Strategic Defense Initiative as the one used by the
Administration for its defense agenda when it first emerged
systemically.

The Administration argued that "above all,

beginning to work on the Strategic Defense Initiative . . .
spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously."137

Reagan

maintained that the existence of this agenda item and its
popular support, both domestically and internationally, and
the awareness of this fact by the U.S.S.R. left them with no
choice but to bargain.138

The Administration also argued

that S.D.I.'s intent was one of peace, replacing the
"insanity" of the Mutual Assured Destruction defense
posture.139
Along with these premises, the White House offered new
arguments for the Strategic Defense Initiative in the
context of Reykjavik.

The White House used questions

concerning the Soviet motive for the meetings as proof for
the necessity of the agenda item.

Reagan stated that he

made proposals that "could satisfy" Soviet "concern while
protecting" U.S. "principles and secur i ty . "1*° The rejection
of those proposals raised several "critical" questions on
which Reagan said the "American people should reflect:
How does the defense of the United States threaten
the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the
Soviets so adamant that America remain forever
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vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today,
all free nations are utterly defenseless against
Soviet missiles, fired either by accident or
design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we
remain so—forever?'*1
The one answer to these questions was the ignoble
motive of the Soviet Union that sought to gain an advantage
over the U.S. and its allies.

As Buchanan reasoned, "If the

Soviets were genuinely sincere in arms control and wanted to
get rid of nuclear weapons, they would have . . .
[negotiated] in a second.'"*2

But according to Buchanan, the

U.S.S.R. refused to give up, in anyway, its military power,"
because their power is the "one thing that makes them
feared, respected, enables them to terrify and intimidate
people," and "that almost separates them from being a thirdworld country."1*3
In addition to, and not mutually exclusive from the
Soviet motive, the agenda item was identified with a
presidency defending American interests.

In his address to

members of the Arms Control Staff, using a device that
Kenneth Burke describes as a "representative anecdote"1**
that provided in itself a summation of the public relations
campaign, Reagan claimed, "The Soviet proposal would have
given them an immediate one-sided advantage and a dangerous
one.

I could not and would not agree to that."1*8

While

Reagan was "willing to go the extra mile," to offer
proposals, "when he saw something that he felt was not in
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the interest of the United States, he had the courage to say
'No.1

It was time to walk away from it.""1*

Finally, S.D.I, was linked to positive repercussions of
Reykjavik.

First, by standing up for U.S. interests, Reagan

had taught the Soviets a "lesson":
tricked.1*7

America could not be

Second, the agenda item was asserted to be

"paying dividends" evidenced by the "progress on the issue
of arms control" at Reykjavik.1*8

"For the first time in a

long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms
reductions" were "moving and moving in the right direction—
not just toward arms control, but toward arms reductions."
Reagan, in another representative anecdote, observed
that "if there is one impression I carry away with me from
these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are
dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason
we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the
Soviets toward even more breakthroughs."1*9

In keeping with

this final argument, the White House asserted that the
Strategic Defense Initiative guaranteed future negotiations
that would benefit from the Reykjavik meetings.

As Shultz

surmised, Reykjavik was only one stage of many in a natural
bargaining process.130
The arguments the White House used to support S.D.I, is
exemplified in the justification Reagan offered concerning
his actions at Reykjavik that protected the Initiative:
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I realize some Americans may be asking
tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand?
Why not give up S.D.I, for this agreement?
The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I, is
America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union
would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik.
S.D.I, is America's security guarantee—if
the Soviets should—as they have done too often in
the past—fail to comply with their solemn
commitments.
S.D.I, is what brought the Soviets back to
arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland.
S.D.I, is the key to a world without nuclear
weapons.,5t
The rhetorical bonding of the Reagan Strategic Defense
Initiative with national security interests [opposite those
of the Soviet's] and the strength of the President allowed
for the redefinition of the failed Iceland meetings.

As the

opinion polls taken October l^th and 15th seemed to suggest,
popular opinion was constructed that seemed favorable to
Administration actions.

From these aggregate measures, the

majority of Americans passively seemed to accept
Administration charges that:

the Soviets were responsible

for the failure to reach accord; the President should not
have given up S.D.I; and the talks even though not
successful would lead to other more profitable negotiating
sessions.
The Strategic Defense Initiative became a rhetorical
instrument to persuade the people that Reykjavik was
successful.

The Administration's unwillingness to make

concessions concerning this item that resulted in the
stalemated meetings, in effect, produced the positive image
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for Reykjavik.

Reagan stated, "The American people don't

mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of
progress. "iae

"So you can see, we made progress in Iceland.

And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a
prudent, deliberate, and above all, realistic approach with
the Soviets."153
Not only did the White House public relations campaign
accomplish its primary objective of overcoming the
rhetorical problem created by Reykjavik, it perhaps
fulfilled a second function of more enduring effects.

By

adapting the Strategic Defense Initiative to a position of a
rhetorical device, they moved the item from the systemic to
the institutional agenda.
Particularly, to construct S.D.I, as an effective
instrument of persuasion, the Administration had to, and did
in fact, make the 'vision' of S.D.I seem real for the
majority of the populace.

This was done by the

Administration using the popular attention that S.D.I, had
attracted to its advantage to construct a symbolic identity
for the initiative.

For instance, Buchanan was quoted as

saying "Gorbachev has done more for S.D.I, in one week than
we've been able to do in a year.'""'
As a symbolic entity, S.D.I arguably enjoyed an
existence analogous to that of other phenomena having their
"bases in symbolism and not in fact," a "comparatively
unflexible, rigid form of adaptation." 1 "

The possible
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result was that S.D.I became interwoven with the American
vision, and as posited by Sam Donaldson, White House
Correspondent for ABC News, comparable to "something that
goes along with the founding principles of this country, as
a bedrock which we won't give up"136

Although the statement

is hyperbolic, Donaldson's opinion may be reflective of the
popular attitude concerning S.D.I in the context of
redefining Reykjavik.
Recontextualized, S.D.I tended to "reflect structural
and institutional biases found within the system," which,
according to Cobb and Elder, is the nature of items having
formal agenda status, 1 "

The rhetorical means used by the

Administration and opinion leaders for persuading the
populace that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a
necessary agenda item perhaps would result in this quality.
This possibility is considered in the next section.
IV
S.D.I. As a Rhetorical Icon
The foreign policy process by its nature attempts to
limit domestic advocacy.

The foreign policy establishment,

during negotiations of the type that occurred at Reykjavik,
would perceive itself at a disadvantage if the foreign
participant knew the U.S. bargaining position that had
already been debated or was being debated domestically while
negotiations were on going.

In the case of Reykjavik, the

establishment would probably feel that General Secretary

Gorbachev would have had only to wait for American public
opinion to register unfavorably toward the Reagan White
House.

The President might feel more compelled to accept

the U.S.S.R.'s proposals because of the impacts facing the
Reagan White House.

Therefore the foreign policy

establishment attempts to prevent public participation in
the process.
The advocacy process is delimited by constructing
popular opinion.

The establishment constructs majority

opinion supporting U.S. agenda items by using discourse that
produces synnationalistic tendencies.

The argument proposed

in this section is that the Administration used the
discourse to recontextualize the Strategic Defense
Initiative on the systemic agenda to construct popular
opinion supporting its actions at Reykjavik
The discourse used during the White House public
relations campaign recontextualized the defensive 'vision'
of the Strategic Defense into a broader vision.

S.D.I.'s

recontextualization made the initiative seem more viable for
the American people.

For instance, following Ronald

Reagan's national broadcast concerning Reykjavik, Tom Foley,
then Democratic Whip in the U.S. House of Representatives,
complained that the President "treats and has always treated
S.D.I, as if it were an existing technology that we're
prepared to put into space to protect us against nuclear
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attack.

It's only the possibi 1 i ty . ",SB

General Daniel

Graham, U.S. Army, Ret., reiterated Foley's observation:
. . . I thought that when the President said
for the first time that he didn't want his own
options cut down, not some future President, that
finally the President has been convinced that we
have readily deployable S.D.I, systems right now.
That a decision to deploy at least three layers of
defense is available to the President, now. So I
don't think that it's something way off in the
future. 1 "
The Time/CBS News Poll, which showed a marked increase in
the number of people who believed S.D.I would work,
indicated that apparently the majority of American citizens
trusted the President.160
At the time of Reykjavik, S.D.I, resided only on the
systemic agenda, existing in the laboratory or on blueprint.
The systemic agenda, according to Cobb and Elder, is
"composed of fairly abstract and general items that do
little more than identify a problem area.

It will not

necessarily suggest either the alternatives available or the
means of coping with the problem."161
When Ronald Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense
Initiative during a speech in 1983, the intent of the
address was not designed specifically for advancement of the
proposal. 1 "

Instead, the speech was intended to gain an

advantage in a debate over defense spending.

In the speech

Reagan discussed numerous areas of Soviet military build-up.
At the conclusion of the address, he suggested a potential
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for overcoming the threat of Soviet strategic nuclear
missiles.

This proposal was not a concretized plan but only

an "effort to define a long-term research and development
program to begin to achieve . . . Cthe] ultimate goal of
eliminating the threat. ",6a

But until such a program could

be conceived, which he argued might not occur "before the
end of the century," Reagan argued for increasing existing
armaments.

These increases, including "modernizing . . .

strategic forces" and "improving . . . non-nuclear
capabilities," would enable the U.S. to "pursue real
reductions in nuclear arms . . . from a position of
strength" and "reduce the risk of a conventional military
conflict. ",6*
When the Reykjavik meetings occurred, the Reagan
Administration still described the Strategic Defense
Initiative as an item for the prevention of an attack by
incoming strategic Soviet missiles.

This description

provided by the Administration did not tell how the
initiative would work.143

For example, Secretary of State

Shultz described S.D.I, immediately following the meetings
as a "vigorous presence . . .

in the nature of an insurance

policy . . . Cthat] would maintain an effective shield for
the United Statrs, for our allies, for the free world. ",6A
But three days later he stated, "I don't know who knows what
S.D.I, is."167

The Strategic Defense Initiative in this
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state was only an abstraction that had been contextualized
as an defensive item.
Popular support was constructed for Administration
actions at Reykjavik S.D.I, because the public relations
campaign was able to recontextualize S.D.I.

This

recontextualization was a product of the discourse of the
public relations campaign.

The Administration, as

initiators of the systemic agenda item, wittingly or not,
was able to attach existing political archetypes that
construct the American vision to S.D.I.

This

recontextualization was accepted by popular opinion.
The Administration drew primarily from the extant
heterogeneity between the United States and the Soviet Union
as its reservoir for the recontextualization of S.D.I.

As

argued, historic and recycled discourse is assimilated by
individuals producing positive and negative archetypes.
Negative archetypal images of the U.S.S.R. have been derived
as the result of originating discourse from the "Red Scare"
period <1945-1950's) and discursively recycled during the
Cold War era.168

Writing during the earlier period, FBI

Director, J. Edgar Hoover, argued that the Soviet attempt
was to subvert the United States making it a part of their
system.149

This intention was in keeping with Winston

Churchill's conviction that the U.S.S.R. "desireCdD the
fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power
and doctrines."170

Hoover later described that doctrine, as
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a "brutal, godless, materialistic way of life which would
ruthlessly destroy . . . [American] values and ideals" and
as a "deadly menace; a scourge which threatens the very
existence of Western civilization."171
These sentiments are kept alive through contemporary
political discourse.

For instance, Reagan's presidency was

characterized by anti-Soviet discourse in which he professed
that:

"All the moral values this country cherishes . . .

are fundamentally challenged by a powerful adversary which
does not wish these values to survive."1712

Individuals

assimilate this discourse producing an archetypal reserve of
predispositions contrasting the United States persona Cgood]
with the Soviet persona CbadD.
The public relations campaign recontextualized the
Strategic Defense Initiative by drawing from this reservoir
of predispositions.

The campaign triggered existing

archetypal predispositions and attached them to the
Strategic Defense Initiative by the descriptions of
Reykjavik.

The White House portrayal was of a menacing

Soviet Union:

They "worship at the altar of power," have

"got nine thousand ballistic missile warheads that can
strike the United States," have a "record of playing fast
and loose with past agreements," "want to see how much
farther they can push us in public," and had the intent of
"killing S.D.I.'"73
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The negative Soviet image was contrasted to the
positive United States position.

The initiative "would

protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman
sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles.

After all,

the world now knows how to make them."17"
The Administration discourse suggested that S.D.I, must
be 'good' since it was a creation of the U.S.

Likewise the

Soviet Union attempted to "kill" the initiative.

The Soviet

Union, "which is out to destroy the United States," would do
all in its power to harm a policy instrument that is in the
interest of the U.S., defense, and goes against the
ostensible best interests of the U.S.S.R., world domination.
The White House's public relations campaign intensified
faith in these archetypal predispositions attached to the
S.D.I, abstraction with other persuasive arguments stemming
from the meetings.

As stated earlier, the White House

argued the Soviet intent for Reykjavik included propaganda
purposes if their "design" to "kill S.D.I." failed.

These

allegations were in keeping with anti-Soviet
predispositions.

Assimilated discourse arguably has

produced a popular sentiment that "CpDropaganda has become
the most powerful single weapon in the communist arsenal.
. . . It is utilized both to supplement military,
conspiratorial, political, diplomatic, or economic measures.
. . .

It is the object of these schemers to raise doubt in

the minds of our misinformed citizens."175
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White House arguments were consistent with this
instilled anti-Soviet predisposition.

The public relations

campaign presented its accounts as "true statements which
are

not very friendly to the U.S.S.R."

Contradictory Soviet

versions were suggested to be attempts to distort.176
Also, accounts stressing presidential actions during
the negotiating process strengthened the U.S. vs. Soviet
archetypes.

As noted above, the Office of the President has

the benefit of non-constitutional roles.

As Clinton

Rossiter writes, the President is "the one-man distillation"
of America.177

In the aftermath of Reykjavik, Reagan was

portrayed as protector of the people.

The Soviets were

pitted against someone "who would judge the interests of the
United States and hold firm for them" and was "capable of
saying 'no.'"178

Revered qualities of the President —

'constructive,' 'creative,' 'amenable yet resolved,' and
'pragmatic'—espoused during the campaign were American
attributes.17'

Reagan's negotiation stance and his refusal

to give up the Strategic Defense Initiative made it
synonymous with a determined American objective of national
defense.
The result of this discourse supported the initial
contextualization of S.D.I.

This contextualization was

a first order semiological relationship of signifier

Soviet

vs. American intent—to signified—the S.D.I, abstraction.
In the aftermath of Reykjavik, S.D.I became a more value-
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weighted abstraction, a defensive instrument of a 'good'
country, protecting itself from the aggressions of a 'bad'
country.
The worth of this contextualization was its ideographic
rhetoricity as a coalition formulation device.

S.D.I, had

the potential for persuading individuals to affiliate with
groups that believe defense to be an overriding U.S.
interest.

The initiative was used by the Administration in

such a way to benefit the Republicans in the 1986 November
congressional elections.

The White House discursively used

the item to revive the charge that Democrats critical of the
initiative were "soft on defense."180
This contextualization, however, had limited
applications for convincing the majority of citizens that
the outcome of Reykjavik was successful.

The efficacy of

the initiative was restricted to its being a defensive
instrument.

S.D.I was in the development phase.

The

initiative was only practical "for long-run insurance"—a
future defense system with no utility for the present.181
A convincing argument still could have been made that
the Administration sacrificed a 'bird in the hand for one in
the bush.'

Perceived Soviet-American tensions had not been

abated, and concrete proposals that could have eased them
had been rejected.

Such objections had the potential of

adversely impacting S.D.I, and the perception of Reykjavik

13E
because no mutual collective agreement exists concerning
U.S. foreign policy.
Citizens have only a framework of appropriate U.S.
actions based on their perceptions of interests fundamental
for the survival of the American vision.

Individuals are

socialized into a tripartite intuition of American interests
which includes economic, defense and world order dimensions.
These 'feelings' are vague conceptualizations of what is
important to foreign policy.

Unless a 'real' crisis occurs

that immediately impacts on one certain dimension Can Oil
embargo (economic) or a hostile attack or takeover of a U.S.
installation (defense)1, American citizens presumably will
direct their attention arbitrarily toward one of the three
interests.
In the case of Reykjavik and S.D.I., no actual crisis
had taken place.

Opponents could have aroused a majority of

citizens with their arguments concerning the economic
(astronomical cost), world order (destabilizing factor), as
well as

defense (deployment feasibility) ramifications

over-shadowing White House arguments.

If S.D.I had remained

solely contextualized as a futuristic defense agenda item,
these opposing arguments could have thwarted Administration
attempts at redefining Reykjavik and retaining the Strategic
Defense Initiative.
For S.D.I, to be useful as more than an ideograph but
as a suasory device for constructing popular opinion, it had
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to take on a more extensive metaphoric meaning for American
foreign policy.

The image of S.D.I had to be moved from a

position having bearing only on a future defense interest
with no real immediate persuasive worth to one encompassing
all three goal areas.

In this state, S.D.I would be

vindicated as a vision essential for the present and would
have a suasory impact on popular opinion against potential
arguments leveled against White House actions at Reykjavik.
The Administration's public relations campaign was able
to construct popular opinion by using synnationalistic
rhetoric.

This discourse was effective because:

1) it

united the economic, world order, and defense interests in
the context of Reykjavik to construct the concept of the
American mission; and 2) it used the archetypal fueled form
of S.D.I, to signify this concept.

The result was a

recontextualization of S.D.I, to a second semiological
level.

The initiative, recontextualized, signified what the

mass holds to be important for U.S. foreign policy.
First, the three interests were combined constructing
the American mission as the underlying concept for the
Iceland meetings.

The American mission, as discussed in

Chapter II, is a hermeneutic that serves as a basis for
convincing citizens the appropriateness of U.S. foreign
policy actions.

This framework dictates that the United

States should protect and promote the U.S. vision by seeking
to convert other nation-states from their doctrines to that
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of a constitutional federal republic modeled after the
American system.
The Administration successfully employed this concept
throughout the Reagan era to defend its foreign policy.

For

instance, in his 1983 "State of the Union Address," Reagan
argued that the U.S. "leadership role in the world came to
us because of . . . the values which guide us as a free
society. "18E

Reagan professed that this "bedrock" provided

the "cornerstone of a comprehensive strategy" that his
Administration "intendCedD to pursue . . . vigorously."
This international "stewardship of peace and freedom"
combined the three interests in that the Administration
argued its "strategy for peace with freedom Cworld order]"
had to be "based on strength—economic and military
strength.'""
As in the 1983 address, the White House public
relations campaign used the American mission to explain the
Reykjavik meetings.

The campaign explicated the meetings as

necessary for "pursuit of . . . [the] ideal toward a world
where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined."18*

This

objective according to Reagan was one that America had been
"honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest
dream of humanity"—the dream of lasting peace and human
freedom."185

Seemingly, Reagan was not solely advocating the

absence of war and extolling the merit of human autonomy.
Instead, he was connoting what U.S. citizens apparently
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consider to be the foreign policy goal of the United States—the "extension of freedom . . . Lai

commitment to the

growth of democratic government and democratic institutions
around the world."184
Second, the campaign recontextualized S.D.I, with the
concept.

Reagan argued that the pursuit of the mission had

led to the initiative that had "most spurred the Soviets to
negotiate seriously" at Reykjavik.107

In this

synnationalistic context, S.D.I, with its archetypal charge
suggestibly became a " 1 iteralization" of the American
mission.'8"
The White House recontextualized S.D.I, as a
1iteralization of the American mission by using metaphoric
discourse to identify S.D.I, to the three U.S. interests.
For instance, the Administration's campaign joined S.D.I,
and the economic interest through its discourse used in the
portrayal of presidential actions at the meetings.
Reagan persona took on that of a shrewd

The

'capitalist' against

the Soviets who were diametrically opposed to that
principle.
The descriptions of Reagan conceivably had semblance to
the average citizen's conception of the U.S. economic
system.

The simplest form of this system according to

Milton Friedman is "freedom of exchange."'"

This system

ingrained within American folklore rests on the principles
of "law and order"190 that "gives people what they want
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instead of what a particular group thinks they ought to
want."" 1
The public relations campaign suggested that Reagan was
skillfully using this most basic meaning of capitalism.
According to Shultz, Reagan was willing to negotiate for
those "things that were potentially important to the United
States and our allies," but he refused to "give the store
CS.D.I.3 away.

. . . CWDhen he saw something that he felt

was not in the interest of the United States, he had the
courage to say 'No.'

"It was time to walk away from it."" s

Through the Administration's use of this discourse, the
Strategic Defense Initiative was recontextualized as a
metaphor for combined United States interests, a
1iteralization of the American mission.

As in the above

example, S.D.I, was a non-negotiable commodity that Reagan
was justified in refusing to give up because of its
defensive and world order benefits.

As Reagan explained,

"There was no way I could tell our people their government
would not protect them against nuclear destruction.

I went

to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable
except two things our freedom and our future."193
Without the benefit of metaphoric discourse, S.D.I.'s
recontextualization, as Robert L. Ivie argues, would be
difficult or impossible.19*

The discourse provided S.D.I,

with the "appearance of sheer rationality" that "compensated
for lingering doubts over any such ambiguities" as the

137
initiative's cost or even its existence.

The initiative

"emerged as a rigid, probative line of reasoning which
presumed to test independently the very metaphor from which
its own premises were drawn."195

On one hand, S.D.I, did

exist since the Soviets rejected Reagan's proposals due to
the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The device was viable, or

why would a militaristic government place demands on it?
Why would they enter into negotiations in which historic
breakthroughs became a possibility, if S.D.I, were not
crucial?
substance.

And yet, the form of S.D.I, did not demand
Shultz stated that the potential agreements that

defined success for Reykjavik were possible "no doubt in
large part because the President has insisted on learning
about strategic defense."196
The campaign enhanced the rhetoricity of the S.D.I,
recontextualization by drawing from other situations.

In

one case, a "goading symbol of American failure dealing with
Russians" was coupled with the more recent Administration
examples of Soviet actions to justify S.D.I.197

White House

Communications Director Buchanan constructed an argument
suggesting that if Franklin Roosevelt had "been as tough at
Yalta as Ronald Reagan was at Reykjavik," the United States
"might not have had some of the problems that we've got
today."198

By referring to Yalta, the Administration drew

from a historic American experience of a negotiating session
that, unlike Reykjavik, had been "greeted with almost
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unanimous praise."

However, the Soviets made "flagrant

violations" of the Yalta provisions and "seemed to speak
contempt for the whole idea of world peace."

The initial

hope that the Yalta Conference would bring better SovietAmerican relations and understanding decayed.199
The campaign recycled the meaning internalized from
this historic example.

The Administration alleged the

Soviets had violated the existing 197S ABM Treaty and the
1975 Helsinki Accords and had been involved in world-wide
regional conflicts.600

These professed situations reinforced

the Soviet vs. American archetypal predisposition that the
U.S.S.R. had not changed drastically from their 1945
posture, fortifying a long held U.S. attitude that the
Soviet "talk much about peace but feverishly prepare for
war."801
question.

As Buchanan asserted:

"This gets down to the

Do you feel that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet

Union are more interested in genuine peace and getting rid
of weapons than Ronald Reagan?"E0E
In this context, S.D.I

literalized a determined moral

America fighting for its vision against an equally
determined morally corrupt Soviet Union.

Upholding S.D.I,

made the initiative symbolic of a U.S. triumph or as
Buchanan argued, "Reagan's 'finest hour.'"803
Besides using situations to intensify the rhetoricity
of S.D.I., the White House campaign used the symbolic power
of the presidency to generate additional credibility.

The
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Administration argued that the office placed Reagan's
judgments beyond reproach.

As Buchanan maintained, "even if

the American people disagree with the President, he was
elected to do what's right."80*

Campaign spokespersons

argued that S.D.I, was an extension of the presidency whose
"function is to defend the national security interest. "eoa
By recontextualizing S.D.I, as a 1iteralization of the
American mission and enhancing the metaphor through
situation and presidential role, the initiative became more
effective for constructing a favorable popular opinion than
its 'defense' rhetoricity.

Without verifiable substance to

its form, arguments against the initiative lost their force.
Three such arguments were:

1) The initiative demonstrated a

U.S. aggressive intent; 2) S.D.I, demanded a huge projected
cost; and 3) S.D.I was not technologically plausible.
First, opponents argued that the Strategic Defense
Initiative was a destabilizing device.

Robert McNamara

observed this tendency occurred because "CtUhere is deep
mistrust on each side CAmerican and Soviet].

Each side

. . . fears the other side is seeking to achieve a first
strike capability.

. . . CT3he steps we take—the actions

we engage in—lead the Soviets to that belief."*06
The public relations campaign overcame this argument by
pointing out the Soviet Union had "devoted far more
resources, for a lot longer time than we, to their own
'S.D.I.'"607

The United States "had not bothered" with an
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anti-ballistic missile system since "the threat of
nationwide annihilation made such limited defense seem
useless."" 8

The Administration incorporated S.D.I within

its agenda only after it determined the program of "mutual
destruction and slaughter" of Soviet and American citizens
"uncivilized."609

From the White House's perspective, having

no shield meant the "slaughter of a bunch of Russians. a,°
The difference between the two systems was that the
Soviet vs. American archetypes attached to S.D.I, made the
perception of the 'operational' Soviet system militaristic
and the envisioned U.S. plan altruistic.

S.D.I.'s form

allowed one state's proven offense to become another
nation's defense.
Reagan manifested the disparate intents.

He told the

American people "if and when we reached the stage of testing
we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet
observation of such tests.

And if the program was practical

we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we
would share the benefits of advanced defenses."611
S.D.I.'s rhetoricity became more compelling in the
context of Reykjavik.

A Pentagon spokesman contrasted the

importance of the U.S. system with the Soviet program at the
meetings in which the Soviets attempted to maintain a
"balance in the balance of terror" while S.D.I, offered
"protection" for both countries "instead of blowing each
other up. "E1E

The Soviet refusal of U.S. proposals because
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of linkage to S.D.I, tended to confirm the White House's
argument of a "critical moral distinction between
totalitarianism and democracy.""3
A second objection raised against the Strategic Defense
Initiative was the enormous cost of the program that was
estimated in the trillions of dollars.

The White House

campaign used the synnationalistic recontextualization of
S.D.I, to shift the focus of the argument from cost to
benefits.

As a 1iteralization of the American mission,

S.D.I.'s objective was to protect the futuristic projection
of the U.S. vision on the international community.
By transferring the locus of the argument, financing
for the program seemed reasonable.

The answer to the charge

of S.D.I.'s high cost was not in terms of dollar amounts.
Instead, the Administration argued, "America can't afford to
take a chance."21*

Reagan contended that "America and the

West need S.D.I, for long-run insurance.

It protects

against the possibility that at some point when the
elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete the
Soviets may change their mind.

We know the Soviet record of

playing fast and loose with past agreements.""'
S.D.I, 's recontextualization suggested a more noble
purpose than solely a U.S. defense interest.

The policy

item limited to an instrument of defense could be challenged
because of massive funding.

Likewise, Administration

actions at Iceland could be disputed due to these cost and

14E
the viability of the item at that time.

But the campaign's

recontextualization of S.D.I, as integral to the American
mission justified spending for a future world interest, an
'insurance policy' for the world.
Comparably, justification for the initiative's
feasibility was constructed by the recontextualized meaning
of S.D.I that broadened its definitional base beyond that of
a defensive weapon.

The Administration recycled what

Zagacki and King contend were S.D.I.'s originating "romantic
themes" of American culture, preservations of American
traditions.614

By directing definitional focus away from

weapons technology, the Strategic Defense Initiative became
a sign for American beneficence and "material prosper i ty. "El7
Furthermore, S.D.I, stood for the benefits of American
ingenuity.

The campaign recycled the Reagan argument,

suggested by Janice Hocker Rushing, the possibility of an
"Edenic past" derived from a "scientific future. "E1B

This

recontextualized meaning of S.D.I., however, did not limit
the initiative's advantages to the United States polity but
suggested world progress through S.D.I.

The initiative

would not destroy, but American technological supremacy and
creativity would be a vehicle for fulfilling the American
mission.

Questions concerning its viability as those

opposing Kennedy's challenge of "going to the moon," would
prevent the U.S. from "getting there."6"
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S.D.I.'s recontextualization worked effectively,
outweighing any likely opposition because the campaign
suggested a sense of participation on the part of the
American people.

Administration strategies for

recontextualizing S.D.I, recycled the myth that people are
collaborators in the nation-state vision.

The U.S. citizens

were ultimately responsible for the success of the American
mission under the guidance of the President.
the American people, " . . .

Reagan told

I have always regarded you, the

American people, as full participants.

Believe me, without

your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor
could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy—world
peace and freedom—be pursued:

Your energy has restored and expanded our economic
might; your support has restored our military
strength. Your courage and sense of national
unity in times of crisis have given pause to our
adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired
the world. The Western democracies and the NATO
alliance are revitalized and all across the world
nations are turning to democratic ideas and the
principles of the free market. So because the
American people stood guard at the critical hour,
freedom has gathered its forces, regained its
strength, and is on the march." 0
The concept of Reykjavik, the American mission, was
fundamental to this strategy.

As argued by the

Administration, S.D.I., as a recontextualization, was
necessary for the eventual fruition of the mission.
According to the Administration, the only way that the
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"dream" could be realized was for American popular opinion
to "maintain . . .

determination and . . .

direction"—to

continue to support the Strategic Defense Initiative."'
The democratizing of the world would take time.

Of

course, America had to survive for the future democratizing
process.

But in the meantime, popular support would

demonstrate through example to the existing democracies and
other nations the virtues of the American form of
government.
Furthermore, American popular opinion would bring the
Soviets back to negotiations because at Reykjavik, as Reagan
contended, "it was this strength and unity that brought the
Soviets to the bargaining table.

And particularly important

was America's support for the Strategic Defense
Ini t iat i ve . "E2E

Eventually Soviet conversion might occur for

as General Graham posited, "CIDt's already got the Soviets
realizing that if these defenses go in masses of nuclear
weapons are not the answer to their problems."" 3

Thus as

long as S.D.I, was accepted by the American people, the
concept would be attainable.
Arguably, the result of the White House public
relations campaign was the creation of a rhetorical icon
from the Strategic Defense Initiative.

As the New York

Times/CBS News Poll indicated the campaign produced "perhaps
stronger, confidence in the . . . plan."ee*

The reason for

this increased popular confidence in the initiative was that
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its meaning became central to American myths.

Primarily,

the initiative was envisioned as a defensive system,
however, the campaign recontextualized S.D.I, to embrace
other interests constructing the American mission.

Popular

acceptance of those interests demanded devotion to the
recontextualization.

In effect, the initiative provided an

immortality symbol for the people.

With its existence came

a promise that the U.S. nation-state could continue to
prosper unthreatened, eventually leading to a world politic
commensurate with the American ideal.
Summary
This analysis of Reagan Administration discourse may
provide insights into the workings of U.S. foreign policy
legitimation.

The popular verdict for the failed Reykjavik

meetings was a measure of the Administration's success in
recontextualizing the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The

Reagan Administration's rejection of Soviet proposals had
come to be seen as saving S.D.I.
The Administration was able to construct popular
opinion by recontextualizing S.D.I, as a guardian and
guarentor of the American mission.

Thus, when demands were

placed on the initiative at Reykjavik, citizens were
persuaded to support the Administration's rejection of those
demands.
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By supporting S.D.I.'s recontextualization, the
citizens were provided with a sense that they were active
participants in the destiny.of the American nation-state.
The sense of 'participation' strengthened the legitimacy of
the foreign policy establishment.

Governmental actions at

Reykjavik were sanctified and the governmental agenda was
strengthened.

The ramifications of this analysis are

discussed in the concluding chapter
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This study concludes with a summary and discussion of
the implications, and suggestions for future research.

In

the first section, the findings of the study are summarized
to show how U.S. foreign policy discourse restricts debate
and limits participation of the citizens.

The argument is

made that this discourse subverts both traditional American
ideals and the deepest rhetorical traditions of civic
humanism.

In the final section, the limitations of the

study are suggested.

Potential areas of research are

outlined that could strengthen the value and test the
usefulness of the model this study proposes.
I
Summary and Implications
Authority in U.S. foreign policy tends to be
centralized within a foreign policy establishment.
assumptions support this arrangement.

Several

First, debate is

assumed to be detrimental to U.S international operations.
Foreign policy operates under the assumption that the policy
is linked to the state's sovereignty and its vision.
Foreign policy is the expression of United States
167
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competition with other nation-states for the advancement of
its national security interests.

In this environment,

oftencharacterized as a situation demanding secrecy and
urgency, debate is deemed counterproductive.
Second, citizens are thought to be incapable of
participating in the decision making process.

Although

majority support is required for foreign policy, individuals
within the United States are regarded as being wedded to
'privatism,' an orientation "toward personal concerns,
including the desire to improve material well-being."1

This

assumed orientation suggests that citizens are unwilling to
spend the time to gain information by which to determine
appropriate policy actions.

Finally, it is assumed that

foreign policy is best left to experts who can mediate its
complexity in terms that ordinary people can grasp.
This study argues that policy advocates use
synnationalistic discourse to overcome these presumptions.
Such discourse is used to solidify majority approval for
foreign policy actions.

Synnationalistic discourse

recontextualizes agenda items as 1iteralizations of the more
pervasive goal of U.S. interests assimilated by citizens,
the American mission.

This mission holds the U.S. vision as

the paragon for the international community.

The items,

synnationalistically contextualized, evoke an image of an
omnipotent United States from the citizens.
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With synnationalistic meaning, foreign policy items
take on a rhetoricity similar to that of 'condensation' or
'key terms.'

The foreign policy items become

recontextualized symbols of the enduring American mission
—rhetorical

icons.

These items are effective in

constructing popular opinion and serve as a means for
decisions to remain centralized and for defusing potential
debate.
The primary implication of this study is that the
discursive process of American foreign policy impairs the
rhetorical tradition and a U.S. axiom.

First, the

traditional foundation of rhetoric has been the rejection of
an absolute truth and a reliance on probability in decision
making.

Seorge Kennedy asserts, rhetoric is only "useful

and legitimate" when two sides are presented and "the choice
between them can be clearly perceived and intelligently
made. "e
Second, the United States as a nation-state system has
as a founding principle that people have a stake in their
political destinies.

The U.S. is an institution created by

and for its people.

It does not vest permanent authority in

'great men' or in special groups of persons.

Ultimately,

the citizens are responsible for its operations.
Synnationalistic discourse harms both ideals.

First,

this discourse removes choice, the "contestable validity
claims," from agenda items.3

Support for foreign policy
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items are not determined by "good arguments"—"a worthiness
to be recognized."*

Instead, advocates interface items with

the American vision to construct popular confidence in their
foreign policy items.
The rhetorical potency for these agenda items, such as
S.D.I., is grounded in their tendency to be immune from
counter-arguments.

To deny these instruments means that

citizens, in effect, deny the U.S. vision.

Conversely, if

supportive, the people, as Representative Jack Kemp said of
those who favored S.D.I., sre

on "high moral and political

ground . "s
Second, the discourse tends to diminish citizen input
to the foreign policy process.

The discourse creates a

"bridge" that suggests to the citizen that his/her interests
are identical with those of the state.6

Over time, mere

passive assent becomes an acceptable substitue for active
participation.7
The outcome, as Havel argues, is an "illusion" that
conceals citizens "adaptation to the status quo."8

The

people acquiesce to the foreign policy establishment
reacting to its decisions rather than actively engaging in
decision making.

The individual is freed to pursue his/her

private ventures knowing that the establishment's decisions
are the 'right' ones.

Instead of having the potential for

being an actor, though minor, in the process, the citizen is
relegated to being an observer.
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For the discursive process to be consistent with the
ideals of rhetoric and the U.S. nation-state, foreign policy
discourse should induce 'true' public participation in the
decision making of the state.

The public, as Gerald A.

Hauser describes, is "participating, judging—in a dynamic
sense—persons who are actively involved in shaping the ways
social wheels turn."9

The public "is active and creative"

that "weighs and exchanges." 0
To achieve this aim, discourse would not be designed
for popular acquiescence.

Instead, the discourse would be a

means of advocacy presenting one view while allowing for
alternatives.

The excusatory function would be removed,

reminding citizens of their participatory responsibilities
in U.S. decisions.
accomplish.

This goal may be impossible to

But, the insights from this and other studies

describing U.S. foreign policy discourse as it is currently
used may move discourse in that direction.
Current changes in the international community may
challenge the specific dimensions of this model since
societal institutions and their presumptions are
are in constant flux.

fragile and

However, the broader assumption on

which this model is based, the synnationalistic tendency of
foreign policy discourse, should have continued
applicability.

For this model to be comprehensive as a

means for analyzing foreign policy discourse, certain
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limitations need to be addressed.

These limitations are

suggested in the next section.
II
Suggestions for Future Research
This approach for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy
discourse is admittedly incomplete for three reasons.

These

limitations need to be addressed to improve the model as
well as to test its usefulness.
on a single extended example.

First, this study is based
The model is operationalized

using the Strategic Defense Initiative in conjunction with
the 1986 Reykjavik meetings.

This model of synnationalistic

discourse needs to be tested in the contexts of other
foreign policy items.

These applications could include not

only items that the United States proposes in its
relationship with the U.S.S.R. but for its dealings with
allies and nonaligned third world countries.
Second, this study assumes the primacy of discourse.
For purposes of scope, this study does not address the
influence of media on the passivity of the U.S. citizenry.
Also, the study does not analyze the impacts of the media on
popular opinion.
Future research could explore these areas.

Studies

might investigate the media's pacifying effects on U.S.
citizens by their coverage of U.S. foreign policy.

Another

area of inquiry could focus on roles of various media in the
construction of popular opinion.

Finally, research might
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extend the exploration of the extent to which the foreign
policy establishment controls the media.

These studies may

make this model of discourse analysis more comprehensive by
expanding it to a mass mediated construct.
A final limitation of this study is the perspective
from which it is written.

This study analyzes U.S. foreign

policy discourse in the context of a bipolar world.

The

model focuses on the U ."5^ foreign policy establishment's
continued reliance on the nation-state vision as it is
constructed in an environment of competition between two
world 'powers,' the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Future studies could apply this model to what is
perhaps an evolving multipolar international community.
These studies could explore what changes might occur in
foreign policy discourse if the basic assumptions that
undergird its rhetoric change.

For instance, studies might

address the potential importance that economics may come to
have on foreign policy discourse.

These studies could

examine competing discourse between multinational
corporations, regional, and ethnic groups pursing their
interests and the foreign policy establishment holding to
the existing nation-state vision as each attempts to
construct popular opinion.
Besides these suggestions for future research, an
additional area of potential investigation exists.

Attempts

could be made to isolate existing icons within U.S. foreign

174
policy.

Studies of this nature might lead to a hierarchical

inventory of icons.
The research might explore the possibility that some
icons are peripheral while others are pivotal.

Some icons

may be minor recontextualizations that can be broken without
any lasting impacts on popular opinion.

Others may be

crucial 1iteralizations of American values, leaving little
room for modification.
These studies may show how the foreign policy
establishment is able, at times, to violate the rhetoricity
of existing icons.

Also, the studies might explain why

foreign policy establishments may become victims to their
own rhetorical creations.

The result of these studies may

eventually lead to foreign policy discourse that is designed
to increase citizen participation in the process.
This chapter has argued that U.S. foreign discourse
should encourage public participation in the decision making
of the state.

This ideal is opposed to the discourse as it

is currently practiced.

Toward that end, the model of

discourse this project proposes attempts to show how the
foreign policy establishment is able to centralize authority
and limit participation.
This chapter also has suggested areas of research that
may strengthen and test the applications of this model.
These descriptive investigations may reveal the
imperfections of foreign policy discourse.

These analyses
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might enable the rhetorical scholar to prescribe
improvements.

Through continuing research of this nature,

legitimate foreign policy discourse eventually may emerge
that directly involves citizens in the decision making
process of the state.
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